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Federalism and Family Status
COURTNEY G. JOSLIN*
The myth of family law’s inherent localism is sticky. In the past, it was common to
hear sweeping claims about the exclusively local nature of all family matters. In
response to persuasive critiques, a narrower iteration of family law localism emerged.
The new, refined version acknowledges the existence of some federal family law but
contends that certain “core” family law matters—specifically, family status
determinations—are inherently local. I call this family status localism. Proponents of
family status localism rely on history, asserting that the federal government has always
deferred to state family status determinations. Family status localism made its most
recent appearance (although surely not its last) in the litigation challenging section 3
of The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).
This Article accomplishes two mains goals. The first goal is doctrinal. This Article
undermines the resilient myth of family law localism by uncovering a long history of
federal family status determinations. Although the federal government often defers
to state family status determinations, this Article shows that there are many
circumstances in which the federal government instead relies on its own family status
definitions.
The second goal of this Article is normative. Having shown that Congress does
not categorically lack power over family status determinations, this Article begins a
long-overdue conversation about whether the federal government should make such
determinations. Here, the Article brings family law into the rich, ongoing federalism
debate—a debate that, until now, has largely ignored family law matters. In so doing,
this Article seeks to break down the deeply rooted perception that family law is a
doctrine unto itself, unaffected by developments in other areas, and unworthy of
serious consideration by others.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a widely held belief that there is something inherently local1 about family
law.2 This intuition is remarkably resilient and sticky. In the past, it was not uncommon
to hear claims that the whole domain of family law was reserved exclusively to the
states.3 In response to such assertions, a number of leading scholars persuasively
demonstrated that these broad claims are false.4 There is a rich and wide web of federal
laws that deeply impact and regulate families. Federal tax law imposes special
protections, or at times special burdens, on people because of their family relationships.5
Likewise, federal law extends additional benefits to the legally recognized family
members of federal employees.6 And federal immigration law establishes who counts
as a family member for purposes of immigration and citizenship.7

1. I use the term “local” here to refer to state as opposed to federal action. I realize that
in other contexts, “local” is often used to refer to substate as opposed to state action. See, e.g.,
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism As the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889,
1906 (2014). My use of the term “local” here, therefore, may be confusing or even seem
incorrect to some. That said, I use the term “local” and the phrase “family law localism” in
this way because this piece builds on other literature that used these phrases in similar ways.
See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV.
1297, 1297 (1998) [hereinafter Hasday, Family Reconstructed] (“The family serves as the
quintessential symbol of localism.”); Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 825, 870 (2004) [hereinafter Hasday, Canon of Family Law] (“The family law canon
insists that family law is exclusively local.”). To be sure, however, other scholars have
considered whether family law should be regulated at a substate level. See, e.g., June Carbone,
Marriage as a State of Mind: Federalism, Contract, and the Expressive Interest in Family
Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49, 55–56 (noting that if the point of family law is to reflect
“different cultural values,” it may make sense to “further localize” the approaches).
2. See infra notes 56–77 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, No.
14-1167, 2014 WL 3702493, at *11 (4th Cir. 2014) (“The Constitution does not grant the
federal government any authority over domestic relations matters, such as marriage.”).
3. See Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1, at 874 (“[A]ssertions of family law’s
exclusive localism are typical.”); see also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)
(“[T]he laws of marriage and domestic relations are concerns traditionally reserved to the
states.”); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) (“[D]omestic relations [is] an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States.”).
4. See Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 220 (2000)
(arguing that sweeping claims “that family law is necessarily and inherently a matter of state
rather than federal law [are] false”). See generally Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy:
The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1761 (2005); Hasday, Family Reconstructed, supra note 1; Reva B. Siegel, She the
People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 947 (2002).
5. See Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1, at 878–79.
6. Id. at 879 (discussing the impact of federal military policy on families).
7. See Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 VA. L. REV.
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In addition to these critiques, there is also a growing recognition in other areas of
law that “dual federalism”—the notion that there are some issues that are exclusively
state based and others that are exclusively federal8—is dead.9 In many, if not most,
other areas of law, scholars recognize that there is concurrent state and federal
authority.10
One might think that either of these developments alone, or certainly taken
together, would result in the demise of family law localism. But the myth lives on,
albeit in a narrower form. The narrower version of family law localism
acknowledges some federal involvement in the family law arena but posits that
there remains a realm of core family law matters that are within the exclusive
authority of the states.11 Specifically, this more refined theory, what I call family
status localism, posits that while states do not have exclusive power over all issues
that impact families, they do have the exclusive authority to define and determine
“family status,” including marital status and status as a parent or a child.12
Proponents claim that this theory is supported by a long and consistent history of
federal deference to state family status determinations.13
Family status localism played an important role in Windsor and in other cases
challenging section 3 of DOMA.14 Advocates argued,15 and some courts agreed,16

629, 631 (2014) (“In its role as regulator of immigration and citizenship, the federal
government has developed its own definitions of family through congressional action—the
Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’)—and agency action and practice, including official
regulations, the Foreign Affairs Manual, and memoranda of understanding.”).
8. Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV.
243, 246 (2005) (defining dual federalism to mean the notion that the “state and national
governments enjoy exclusive and non-overlapping spheres of authority”).
9. See, e.g., id. at 250 (noting that the notion of dual federalism “does not accurately
characterize the current allocation of governmental authority in the United States”).
10. Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualist Federalism to Interactive Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J.
1, 5 (2006) (noting that “separating state from federal domains became impossible” after 1937).
11. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
12. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Windsor
at 3–4, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Federalism
Scholars’ Brief] (“Our claim is not that family law is an exclusive field of state authority, but
rather that certain powers within that field—such as the power to define the basic status
relationships of parent, child, and spouse—are reserved to the States.”).
13. See, e.g., Maura T. Healey, A State’s Challenge to DOMA: Federalism and
Constitutional Rights, 5 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 422, 428 (2012) (“Despite significant division
and disagreement over these state marriage rules, many of which were politically and socially
contentious at the time, the federal government had always deferred to state definitions of
marriage.”); see also Brief of 172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S.
Senators as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging
Affirmance on the Merits at 32, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307), [hereinafter Brief of
Members of Congress] (“Congress consistently deferred to the States on issues of marriage
and family law.”).
14. Section 3 of DOMA defined “marriage” as the union of one man and one woman for
all federal purposes. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (held unconstitutional by United States v. Windsor,
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
15. See supra note 12.
16. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d
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that section 3 was an impermissible attempt by the federal government to regulate
the “truly” local family law matter of family status determinations.17 Invocations of
the theory of family status localism are not uncommon.18 In recent years, similar
claims have been seen in judicial opinions,19 legislative histories,20 and the
mainstream media.21 This Article is the first to subject this more refined family status
localism theory to careful scrutiny.
This Article has two primary goals. The first goal is doctrinal. This piece subjects
the claim of the exclusively local nature of family status determinations to careful
scrutiny. Is it true that family status determinations have been solely reserved to the
states? To consider this question, this Article explores a largely unexamined history
of federal involvement with one particular family status—the status of being
someone’s “child.” For those unfamiliar with family law, who a particular person’s
child is may seem obvious. And sometimes it is obvious and clear. This is usually
the case when a married husband and wife are the genetic parents of a child they and
they alone care for.22 But in a variety of circumstances, the answer is and has been a
contested and politically fraught one.23 Historically, for example, the genetic

234, 249 (D. Mass. 2010) (concluding that section 3 of DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment
because it regulated an issue—“marital status determinations”—that was an “attribute of state
sovereignty”), aff’d, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).
17. To be clear, I think the Court’s conclusion in United States v. Windsor that section 3
of DOMA is unconstitutional is correct. Contrary to the arguments made by some advocates,
however, it is my opinion that section 3’s constitutional infirmity was an equal protection one,
not a federalism one. For a rich discussion of the equal protection and due process themes in
the Court’s Windsor decision, see generally Douglas NeJaime, Windsor’s Right to Marry, 123
YALE L.J. ONLINE 219 (2013).
18. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stępień-Sporek, A Tale of Two Federal Systems,
21 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 589, 595 (2013) (“As a result, family law has become firmly
embedded in the states’ domain, although a minority of family issues have been viewed as a
matter of national importance considered on the federal level.”).
19. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326 (5th Cir. 1994) (“Federal respect
for state domestic relations law has a long and venerable history.”).
20. As stated in the dissenting views of DOMA’s House Report:
[T]he Federal government has always relied on the states’ definition of marriage
for Federal purposes, and . . . it is unwarranted and an intrusion on states[’] rights
to change that practice now. The Federal government has no history in
determining the legal status of relationships, and to begin to do so now is a
derogation of states’ traditional right to so determine.
H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 43 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2946
(dissenting views).
21. George F. Will, A Matter of Jurisprudence, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2013, available at
2013 WLNR 6859988 (“As the scholars’ brief says, DOMA ‘shatters two centuries of federal
practice’ by creating ‘a blanket federal marital status that exists independent of states’
family-status determinations.’”).
22. See Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 7, at 631.
23. For example, historically, the legal parentage of nonmarital children was a contested
issue. See Zanita E. Fenton, Bastards! . . . . And the Welfare Plantation, 17 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 9, 9 (2014) (exploring how the legal status of illegitimate children “assisted in gender
subordination” and “contributed to the maintenance of racial stratification”); Solangel
Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma, and Discrimination Against Nonmarital
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offspring of an unmarried man was often not considered his child for some or all
purposes.24
Consistent with the conventional narrative, many federal statutes do defer to state
definitions of child.25 But my historical analysis demonstrates that this is not always
the case. The federal government often used, and continues to use, its own family status
definitions.26 In some cases, the federal government chose to override state family
status determinations for what might be described as discriminatory reasons. DOMA,
of course, is a contemporary example of this.27 What has largely been ignored,
however, are the many examples pointing in the other direction:28 the federal statutes,
regulations, and judicial opinions that utilize independent federal definitions of family
status to ameliorate the effects of state-level discrimination against certain families.29
The second goal of this Article is normative. To date, much of the discussion
about federal family status determinations has focused on the structural question of
whether the federal government can act in this area. This structural focus has
obscured consideration of the normative questions of whether the federal government
should be involved in making family status determinations and, if so, when.
A rich body of scholarship considers these normative questions as they apply to
other areas of law, including immigration law,30 environmental law,31 and education

Children, 63 FLA. L. REV. 345, 350–56 (2011) (exploring the historical treatment of nonmarital
children).
24. See infra Part II; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Marriage, Biology, and Federal
Benefits, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1489–90 (2013) (discussing the evolution of state family law
rules regarding nonmarital children).
25. See infra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part II.
27. See infra Part II.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part II.
30. See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism,
61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 792 (2008) (arguing that the “constitutional mandate for federal
exclusivity over pure immigration law is far more contestable than the traditional debate would
suggest” and laying out the values that should be considered when considering state involvement
in the area of immigration law). See generally Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration
Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State
and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609 (2012); Cristina M. Rodríguez,
The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Juliet
P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C.
L. REV. 1557 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the
Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001).
31. See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case
Against Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796, 1808,
1850 (2008) (detailing the “virtues that a dynamic system of overlapping federal-state
jurisdiction has for environmental policymaking”); Kirsten H. Engel & Scott R. Saleska,
Subglobal Regulation of the Global Commons: The Case of Climate Change, 32 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 183, 189 (2005) (describing how the “domino effect” of state and federal regulation can
produce positive results); Jody Freeman & Daniel A. Farber, Modular Environmental
Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795, 911 (2005) (proposing a “modular” conception of
environmental regulation that involves, among other things, “multiple levels of government
with differing capacities”).
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law.32 For example, scholars vigorously debate the role states should play with regard to
immigration reform, an area previously thought to be exclusively federal in nature.33 But
because scholars and courts tend to view family law issues as “exceptional,”34 family law
is frequently omitted from these discussions.35
This Article seeks to bridge the gap between family law scholarship and the robust
literature on the values of federalism.36 Ultimately, this Article does not offer a
simple road map for determining which level of government should make family
status determinations in any particular circumstance. Instead, drawing upon
federalism scholarship, the Article sets forth a number of considerations to guide a
more vigorous consideration of this question going forward.
Part I of this Article examines the evolution of claims regarding family law’s inherent
localism. As others (including Judith Resnik,37 Jill Hasday,38 and Kristin Collins39)
demonstrate, claims that the federal government lacks authority to act in family law are

32. See generally, e.g., Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education
Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 287 (2013); Shannon K. McGovern, Note, A New Model
of States as Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1519 (2011).
33. See, e.g., Adrian J. Rodríguez, Punting on the Values of Federalism in the
Immigration Arena? Evaluating Operation Linebacker, a State and Local Law Enforcement
Program Along the U.S.-Mexico Border, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1226 (2008).
34. See, e.g., JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 7 (2014) (examining
“family law exceptionalism,” the notion that family law “rejects what the law otherwise
embraces[,] and does what the law otherwise rejects”); Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical
Directions in Comparative Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family
Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 753, 753 (2010) (introducing an issue of the journal
devoted to “‘family law exceptionalism’: the myriad ways in which the family and its law are
deemed, either descriptively or normatively, to be special”).
35. Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 273 (2009) (“Within the immense literature on federalism, a
small subset centers on federalism questions concerning the family and family law.”).
36. See generally, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV.
499 (1995); Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 93 (2008).
37. Judith Resnik, Reconstructing Equality: Of Justice, Justicia, and the Gender of
Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 393, 415 (2002) [hereinafter Resnik, Reconstructing
Equality] (“First, although statements that family law ‘belongs’ to the states are often made,
federal statutory regimes govern many facets of family life.”); Judith Resnik, Categorical
Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619, 621 (2001) [hereinafter
Resnik, Categorical Federalism] (sketching an “empirical case against categorical federalism
by showing that the very areas characterized in the [Violence Against Women Act] litigation
as ‘local’—family life and criminal law—have long been subjected to federal lawmaking”);
Judith Resnik, “Naturally” Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction, and the Federal Courts,
66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1697 (1991) [hereinafter Resnik, Without Gender] (exploring the
“sources of this ideology of the absence of families and of women from the federal courts to
examine how it is both true and false”).
38. Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1.
39. Collins, supra note 4, at 1764 (noting “the standard perception that there is a
long-standing tradition of federal non-involvement in domestic relations law and policy”).
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hardly new. To the contrary, such assertions are “typical.”40 In response to persuasive
critiques of sweeping family law federalism claims, recent invocations of the claim have
become more refined. For example, in the litigation challenging section 3 of DOMA,
advocates and scholars contended that there was one particular area of family law that
was off-limits for the federal government—defining and determining family status.41
Using the lens of children, Part II demonstrates that this more refined family law
federalism theory is belied by history. The federal government has long been in the
business of defining and determining family status. While there has been some
scholarship documenting federal involvement in the area of family status, this Part
offers a novel contribution by documenting a previously untold part of this history.
Specifically, this Part uncovers examples where the federal government provided its
own family status determinations to mitigate the effects of state-level discrimination.
After demonstrating a long history of federal involvement in family status
determinations, Part III considers the normative questions of whether and when the
federal government should be involved in family status determinations. Given the
incredible impact that family status determinations have on almost all aspects of a
person’s life, it is critical to bring this normative question to the fore.
I. FAMILIES AND FEDERALISM
In recent decades, there has been increasing acknowledgement in most other areas
of law that “dual federalism is dead.”42 Scholars generally recognize that it has become
impossible to separate state from federal domains.43 However, many scholars and
judges continue to cling to the belief that family law is an exception to this rule.
In the wake of dual federalism’s general demise, many scholars consider how the
various levels of government should share power. Robert Schapiro, for example, argues
in favor of what he calls interactive federalism: “Rather than focusing on how to
separate state and federal jurisdiction, interactive federalism explores how the federal
and state governments can work together to advance a variety of policy goals.”44 In a
similar vein, Erwin Chemerinsky asserts that “federalism should be viewed as not
being about limits on any level of government, but empowering each to act to solve
difficult social issues.”45 Others, including Ernest Young, believe that constraints on
the power of the federal government are “both an integral principle of our Constitution
and a critical element of our political community.”46

40. Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1.
41. See Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12.
42. Schapiro, supra note 8; see also Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112
MICH. L. REV. 1, 51 (2013) (“Neither dual federalism nor latent exclusivity governs today.
Instead, there is an appreciation that the authority of state and national governments
pervasively overlaps.”). See generally Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,
36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
43. Schapiro, supra note 10.
44. Id. at 8.
45. Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When it Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313,
1329 (2004).
46. Ernest A. Young, What Does It Take To Make a Federal System? On Constitutional
Entrenchment, Separate Spheres, and Identity, 45 TULSA L. REV. 831, 844 (2010).
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There is also a burgeoning body of literature considering the allocation of power
between the states and the federal government in a variety of specific subject matter
areas, including immigration law,47 environmental law,48 and education law.49 For
example, there has been a robust debate about the role of the states and local
governments in an area historically understood to be reserved to the federal
government50—immigration law.51
Family law, however, is often omitted from these discussions.52 In contrast to other
areas of law where overlapping state and federal power is the norm, family law is held
out as an example of a “truly local” domain.53 This is yet another example of what
scholars have identified as family law exceptionalism.54 As others have noted, family
law is generally understood to depart from the rules that apply to other areas of law.55
And it is not just legal scholars who subscribe to this understanding. On a number
of occasions in recent decades, the Supreme Court made sweeping claims suggesting
that all of family law is reserved to the states.56 For example, in Elk Grove Unified
School District v. Newdow, the Supreme Court declared, “[t]he whole subject of the
domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the
States and not to the laws of the United States.”57 Likewise, in Sosna v. Iowa, the
Court stated, “domestic relations[ is] an area that has long been regarded as a virtually
exclusive province of the States.”58

47. See supra note 30.
48. See supra note 31.
49. See supra note 32.
50. Wishnie, supra note 30, at 494 (considering “whether the federal power to regulate
immigration, a power not specifically enumerated in the Constitution but universally
recognized for over a century, is among those that are exclusively national and incapable of
devolution to the states” (footnote omitted)).
51. See supra note 30.
52. See Estin, supra note 35. The omission of family law is not limited to the federalism
literature. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction: Same-Sex Couples
and Minimum Contacts, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1674 (2011) (noting that contemporary
scholarship on jurisdiction has largely “failed to subject the [anomalous jurisdictional rule that
applies to divorce] to serious consideration and critique”).
53. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 509 (2000)
(noting that in Morrison, the Supreme Court suggested that family law was one of the “truly
local” spheres); see also supra note 3.
54. See HASDAY, supra note 34, at 15 (observing that “family law can be thought of as a
system of exemptions from the everyday rules that would apply to interactions among people
in a non-family law context” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Martha Albertson
Fineman, What Place for Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1999)));
Halley & Rittich, supra note 34.
55. See e.g., HASDAY, supra note 34.
56. Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Windsor,
Federalism, and Family Equality, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 156, 159 (2013) (noting that
“in a number of decisions in the last half-century, the Supreme Court has made rather sweeping
statements about the lack of federal power or authority in the area of family law”).
57. 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593–94 (1890)).
58. 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975).
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The perception that family law is inherently local is so sticky that it persists (albeit
now in a slightly narrowed form) despite persuasive critiques to the contrary.59 A
handful of family law and women’s rights scholars (including Judith Resnik,60 Reva
Siegel,61 Sylvia Law,62 Jill Hasday,63 and Kristin Collins64) convincingly
demonstrate that broad claims “that family law is necessarily and inherently a matter
of state rather than federal law [are] false.”65 On the contrary, for much of our history
the federal government has regulated families both directly and indirectly through a
vast and complex range of statutes and regulations.66 A few of the many federal laws
that regulate families include tax law, immigration law, Social Security law, federal
employee benefits, and federal provisions related to adoption, child custody, and
child support.67 As Jill Hasday explains, these federal laws “establish what
constitutes a family for their purposes, distribute privileges and burdens on the basis
of marital status, and only recognize relationships of dependency if they exist within
certain specified family groups.”68
And this federal involvement in the family is not new.69 Ann Laquer Estin reminds
us that “[t]he [federal] Comstock Act of 1873 outlawed the transportation of
contraceptives across state lines.”70 This prohibition, of course, directly impacted the
timing and size of families. “The [federal] Maternity Act of 1921 provided for
appropriations to the states for a program designed to reduce maternal and infant
mortality,”71 again, directly impacting the size of families as well as the health of
their members. Looking even further back in time, Kristin Collins shows that

59. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Resnik, Reconstructing Equality, supra note 37, at 415 (“First, although
statements that family law ‘belongs’ to the states are often made, federal statutory regimes
govern many facets of family life.”); Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 37, at 644–
53 (describing “federal family lawmaking”); Resnik, Without Gender, supra note 37, at 1721,
1721–29 (cataloguing some of the many federal laws that “govern a host of legal and economic
relations that do affect and sometimes define family life”).
61. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 4.
62. See, e.g., Law, supra note 4.
63. See, e.g., Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1; Hasday, Family Reconstructed,
supra note 1.
64. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 4.
65. Law, supra note 4.
66. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 4; Hasday, Family Reconstructed, supra note 4; Siegel,
supra note 4.
67. Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1, at 875 (“Whatever else they do and
whatever other legal subjects they implicate, federal social security law, employee benefit law,
immigration law, tax law, Indian law, military law, same-sex marriage law, child support law,
adoption law, and family violence and abuse law are also forms of family law.”).
68. Hasday, Family Reconstructed, supra note 1, at 1376.
69. See, e.g., Resnik, Without Gender, supra note 37, at 1743, 1743–44 (discussing
“nineteenth century federal efforts to control polygamy and sexual relations, which in turn
affect family relations, albeit nontraditional ones”).
70. Estin, supra note 35, at 274.
71. Id. at 274–75.
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during the pre-Civil War era all three branches of the federal government
were actively engaged in creating and enforcing laws and policies that
bore directly on families, whether it was the creation and administration
of widows and orphans’ war pensions, the regulation of married
women’s citizenship, or—perhaps most surprisingly—the resolution of
an array of domestic relations issues in federal court, often pursuant to
uniform federal standards.72
In light of these critiques, it is now less common to see sweeping claims of family
law’s inherent localism.73 Scholars and advocates now often concede that Congress
can and has enacted statutes that deeply impact families.74 But the underlying
intuition that there is something inherently local about family law has proven to be
very sticky. Thus, rather than being abandoned, the claim has instead been
narrowed.75 Proponents of this more refined family status localism claim posit that
there are certain core family law matters76—specifically determinations of family
status, including marital status and status as a child—that are solely within the
purview of the states.77
Family status localism was foregrounded in the recent litigation challenging
section 3 of DOMA.78 Indeed, it was this family status localism argument that
carried the day at the district court level in one of these challenges—Massachusetts
v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.79 Specifically, the district court
in Massachusetts held that section 3 of DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment

72. Collins, supra note 4, at 1767–68.
73. While they are less common, such assertions have not disappeared altogether. See,
e.g., Lauren Gill, Note, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the Context of Free,
Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1715, 1736 (2013) (“Under the United
States’ system of federalism, family law remains the domain of the states . . . .”).
74. See, e.g., Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12, at 3–4 (acknowledging that
family law is not an “exclusive field of state authority”).
75. Libby Adler predicted this would happen. Libby S. Adler, Federalism and Family, 8
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 239 (1999) (“A defender of the axiom might grant that not all of
family law is state law, but argue that some identifiable subset of family law truly is a matter
of state law.”).
76. The more refined family status federalism theory avoids one of the critiques of the
more sweeping claim that, if accepted, it “would undermine the constitutionality of wide
swaths of federal regulatory programs and seriously constrict federal regulatory power.” Jack
M. Balkin, Be Careful What You Wish for Department: Federal District Court Strikes Down
DOMA, BALKINIZATION (July 8, 2010, 6:35 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/be
-careful-what-you-wish-for-department.html.
77. See, e.g., Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12; see also Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16 (2004) (“Newdow’s parental status is defined by California’s
domestic relations law.”); Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12, at 27 (“This Court has
frequently, and recently, echoed that determining family status remains a State power.”); id.
at 29 (“[Federal law] does not legitimate children, perform adoptions, or terminate parental
rights. Though federal legislation might promote, shape, or encourage those relationships, it
cannot create or extinguish them wholesale.”).
78. See United States v. Windsor. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding section 3 of
DOMA unconstitutional).
79. 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010).
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because it regulated an issue—marital status determinations—that was an “attribute
of state sovereignty.”80
In Windsor81 itself, a group of federalism scholars pressed the family status localism
argument. The federalism scholars argued that section 3 was unconstitutional because
Congress did not have the authority to define or determine family status. “[T]he power
to define the basic status relationships of parent, child, and spouse . . . ” the scholars
asserted in their brief to the Supreme Court, “[is] reserved to the States.”82 Similar
statements were made about section 3 in legal scholarship as well as in the mainstream
media.83 Proponents of this position contend that it is supported by an unbroken
historical practice: “[Congress] has never . . . jettisoned its longstanding deference to
state determinations of marital status.”84 Family status localism had such rhetorical
power that Justice Kennedy seemed poised to embrace it.85 In the end, however, the
Court declined either to embrace or reject the theory.86
Despite the Court’s failure to do so, there are a number of reasons why it is
nonetheless important to subject this claim of family status localism to careful
scrutiny. First, as noted above, beliefs about family law’s inherent localism have
proven to be extremely sticky. Even though a number of prominent scholars have
convincingly documented a long history of federal involvement in family law, the
notion that family law is reserved to the states lives on.87

80. Id. at 249; see also id. at 250 (“The history of the regulation of marital status
determinations therefore suggests that this area of concern is an attribute of state sovereignty,
which is ‘truly local’ in character.”).
81. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
82. Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12, at 4.
83. See, e.g., Healey, supra note 13, at 435 (“For more than one hundred years in a long
line of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that domestic relations are the
paradigmatic area of state, not federal, concern, and that marital status lies at the core of
domestic relations law.”); Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act:
Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 421 (1999) (arguing that
section 3 violates the Tenth Amendment because it “seriously impairs a state’s power to define
the ‘marriage’ relationship”).
84. Brief on the Merits of Amici Curiae Family Law Professors and the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor at 14,
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Family Law Scholars’ Brief]; see also id.
at 18 (“[T]here are no ‘uniform’ federal definitions of marital or parental status.”).
85. For example, during oral argument in Windsor, Justice Kennedy repeatedly declared
that the question presented by Windsor was “whether or not the Federal government, under
our federalism scheme, has the authority to regulate marriage.” Transcript of Oral Argument
at 76, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
86. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (“[I]t is unnecessary to decide whether this federal
intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the federal
balance.”); see also Neomi Rao, Essay, The Trouble with Dignity and Rights of Recognition, 99
VA. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2013) (“Nor does the Court find that DOMA exceeds the scope of
federal power.”). Elsewhere, I argue that while the Court declined to explicitly address the
accuracy of this claim in Windsor, aspects of the Windsor opinion suggest that the Court would
reject the claim if pressed. Joslin, supra note 56, at 165 (arguing that “the Court appeared to
concede that at least a sweeping categorical family status federalism theory is belied by history”).
87. See Brief on the Merits for Amicus Curiae the Partnership for New York City in
Support of Respondent Windsor and Affirmance of the Second Circuit at 3, Windsor, 133 S.
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Second, despite the growing recognition that dual federalism is dead, there have
been a variety of attempts in the last several decades to reverse this trend and to return
power to the states.88 As Rena Steinzor has explained, “The Reagan administration
popularized the so-called ‘new Federalism’—a political doctrine that calls for radical
downsizing of the federal government and the return of power to the states.”89
Returning power to the states was also a strong theme undergirding the Republican
Party’s 1994 Contract with America,90 and is likewise a guiding principle of the Tea
Party.91 In addition to these political movements, some members of the Supreme
Court have expressed interest in revitalizing older notions of federalism.92 Thus, it is
likely that variations of family law localism will appear again.
II. FEDERAL FAMILY STATUS DETERMINATIONS: A MORE COMPLETE HISTORY
As noted above, in the wake of persuasive critiques, family law localism claims
have become more refined. Instead of asserting that all family law matters are
exclusively local, proponents are now more likely to argue that there are certain core
family law matters—specifically family status determinations—that are outside the
scope of Congress’s power. To date, there has been no careful analysis of the
accuracy of the more refined family status localism claim.
This Article seeks to fill the gap in the literature. Consistent with the conventional
narrative,93 it is true that the federal government often defers to or incorporates state
family status rules. For example, many federal statutes explicitly provide that
whether a person is married for federal purposes is based on whether the person is
considered married under state law.94 And in other contexts, even when the statute

Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307) (“DOMA’s creation of a federal definition of marriage must be
carefully reviewed because it is fundamentally inconsistent with basic principles of federalism.
Since our nation was founded, the institution of marriage has been regulated by the States, not
by Congress.”); see also Hasday, Canon of Family Law, supra note 1.
88. See Rena I. Steinzor, Unfunded Environmental Mandates and the “New (New)
Federalism”: Devolution, Revolution, or Reform?, 81 MINN. L. REV. 97, 111–12 (1996).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 123–24 (“The Contract with America is in many ways an eerie reprise of the most
popular Reagan rhetoric. It hails federalism as the centerpiece of a revolution that would restore
the health of the nation by cutting big government, turning power and responsibility back to the
states, and deregulating in the areas important to American industry.”).
91. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Essay, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and
Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 510 (2012) (noting that the “long-term goal of the
Tea Party movement is to shrink the size and power of the federal government and thus alter
our system of federalism”).
92. See Schapiro, supra note 8, at 280 (noting the Court’s “renewed interest in federalism”).
See generally Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007) (describing and critiquing recent
emphasis on the need for mutual exclusivity in state and federal powers).
93. See Brief of Members of Congress, supra note 13, at 33–34 (“To this day, with full
understanding that married couples may be treated differently in different States, the federal
government continues to defer to state law to determine marital status . . . .”).
94. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (providing that “[a]n applicant is the
wife, husband, widow, or widower . . . if the courts of the State in which such insured
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does not explicitly defer to state law, it is done as a matter of practice.95 But, as this
Article documents, the federal government does not and has not always deferred to
state family status determinations.
There is a small body of literature considering federal involvement with family
status determinations.96 These explorations, however, have been limited to
consideration of particular instances of federal involvement.97 More importantly, the
existing literature examines only one side of the equation—instances in which the
federal government overrode state rules for what might be described as
“discriminatory purposes.”98 These examples tend to reinforce the intuition that we
should be wary of federal involvement in family law.99 To adequately assess the

individual is domiciled . . . would find that such applicant and such insured individual were
validly married”); see also Family Law Scholars’ Brief, supra note 84, at 25–26 (providing
examples of federal statutes that explicitly rely on state determinations of status).
95. See, e.g., Family Law Scholars’ Brief, supra note 84, at 20–24 (providing examples
of federal statutes that implicitly rely on state determinations of status). See generally William
Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1423
(2012) (exploring choice of law questions that arise when federal law relies implicitly or
explicitly on the “state-defined institution of marriage”).
96. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, Involuntary Imports: Williams, Lutwak, the Defense of
Marriage Act, Federalism, and “Thick” and “Thin” Conceptions of Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 771, 784 (2012) (“At present, Congress has chosen to reject, limit, and qualify the
transportability of marital status created by the states into federal law in some cases, based on
consideration of such factors as the need for national uniformity, ease of application, concerns over
federalism (including the controversial or negative impact upon the federal government or program,
or upon other states), and the attainment of numerous substantive national policy objectives.”).
97. See infra Part II.A; see also Wardle, supra note 96; Lynn D. Wardle, Section Three
of the Defense of Marriage Act: Deciding, Democracy, and the Constitution, 58 DRAKE L.
REV. 951, 953 (2010) (exploring “[w]hether Congress, the judiciary, or the executive branch
decides whether, when, where, or how same-sex marriages created in a state will be recognized
in federal laws, regulations, and programs”).
98. There is also a small body of literature examining federal laws that impose additional
requirements on top of state family status rules, usually to guard against fraud. For example,
federal law defines marriages for certain immigration purposes to exclude marriages entered
into “for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission” to the United States even if the
marriage was valid for state law purposes. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012). The federal
tax code similarly treats unmarried people as married if they divorced for the purpose of
gaining tax benefits. See, e.g., Rev. Rule. 76-255, 1976-2 C.B. 40. For a rich discussion of the
many different meanings of marriage fraud, including marriage fraud in the contexts of
immigration and tax law, see generally Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1
(2012). There are similar rules with regard to children. For example, while adopted children
are considered children under state family status law, the Social Security Act places some
additional limitations on the rights of adopted children to seek Social Security benefits. For
children adopted by an insured individual who is already receiving benefits, the child is
entitled to children’s Social Security benefits only if the adoptive parent was previously a
stepparent to the child or had been living with or supporting the child for the year prior to the
adoption. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(8) (2012). This requirement was likely added to “prevent[ ] abuse
of the secondary benefit scheme by denying benefits to children who might be adopted solely
to qualify them for such benefits.” Clayborne v. Califano, 603 F.2d 372, 377 (2d Cir. 1979).
99. See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should
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normative question considered in Part III, it is important to have a full and complete
understanding of when and under what circumstances the federal government has
participated in defining family status.
What has largely been omitted from the limited scholarship that is available on
this issue is consideration of the many examples pointing in the other direction—that
is, the many federal programs that disregard state family status rules in order to
mitigate state-level discrimination against certain family forms.
Using children as the lens, this Article fills this gap in the literature. This Article
shows that throughout our history, there have been numerous programs in which the
federal government overrode or disregarded state definitions of child because those
state definitions were insufficiently protective.100 This history is critical, both to the
doctrinal question of whether the federal government has the power to act in this area
of law as well as to the normative question of whether it should.
A. Federal Efforts To Deny Family Status Benefits
As noted above, while the federal government often defers to state family status
determinations, it does not and has not always done so. Some of the instances in
which the federal government refused to defer to state family status determinations
were situations in which the federal government sought to deny family-based benefits
or protections to people who were considered family members under state law.101
And in many if not all instances, these laws were prompted by a congressional
determination that these family members were unworthy or undesirable.102
The contemporary example of such a law is section 3 of DOMA.103 Section 3
denied federal recognition to all same-sex spouses, even if their home states

Tread Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 399 (2008)
(“The federal attention can become pernicious, however, if federal program requirements demand
changes in state law that could disrupt the fabric of family law and policy in a state. Because family
policy is closely connected to community norms and local social cohesion, such disruptions can
have deleterious social effects that were neither anticipated nor desired by Congress.”).
100. See infra Part II.B.1.
101. See generally, e.g., Kristin A. Collins, Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship
and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation, 123 YALE L.J. 2134 (2014)
(describing efforts by federal officials to deny jus sanguinis citizenship to certain nonwhite
children born abroad).
102. See, e.g., id. at 2232 (“[I]t reveals the limitation of citizenship transmission between
the American father and his nonmarital foreign-born child as the product of choices of [federal]
officials charged with enforcing and developing the rules that governed membership in the
polity—rules that were constructed and construed in ways that tended to exclude nonwhite
children from citizenship.”); Rose Cuison Villazor, The Other Loving: Uncovering the
Federal Government’s Racial Regulation of Marriage, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1361, 1367 (2011)
(“Yet state laws and actors were not the only legal bulwarks that pursued racist goals by
restricting individuals’ right to marry their partners of choice. As Bouiss illuminates, in the
decades before Loving, a different and overlooked type of racial regulation of marriage
occurred . . . at the federal level . . . .”).
103. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (limiting the definition of marriage and spouse for all federal
purposes to opposite-sex marriages and spouses); see also United States v. Windsor. 133 S.
Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional).
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considered them to be validly married.104 A small number of scholars have
considered other examples.105 Rose Cuison Villazor, for example, documents how
the federal government refused to allow certain interracial couples to marry, even if
the parties would have been entitled to marry as a matter of state family law.106
Specifically, she shows how a “system of federal race-based marriage restrictions . . .
comprised of immigration, citizenship, and military laws and regulations”
collectively restricted who U.S. military servicemembers could marry.107 Thus,
Villazor demonstrates that it simply is not true that the states have always had
complete control over entry into marriage.
In the context of children, Kristin Collins demonstrates how federal officials
sometimes disregarded state family status standards in the context of citizenship
determinations for nonwhite or mixed-race nonmarital children born abroad.108 Her
examination reveals that whether or how federal officials deferred to state family
status standards often depended on the perceived appropriateness of the family.109
Her close review of the historical records suggests that even when federal officials
purported to look to and rely upon state domestic relations rules: “[Federal]
immigration officials were far less rigid in their conception of ‘legitimacy’ in cases
involving foreign-born children of white American Mormons than in cases involving
foreign-born children of Chinese Americans.”110
As in the case of DOMA, Villazor and Collins document instances when the
federal government disregarded or altered state family status rules to further
discriminatory ends.111
B. Federal Efforts To Extend Family Status Benefits
Little or no existing scholarship examines federal programs or policies that
departed from state family status rules in order to override state-level discrimination.

104. Joslin, supra note 24, at 1471 (“Due to Section 3, validly married same-sex spouses
are denied an estimated 1138 federal rights and responsibilities extended to heterosexual
spouses by virtue of their marital status.”).
105. Although there are other examples of federal involvement in family status for the
purpose of denying benefits to persons considered family members as a matter of state law,
Congress had never adopted a federal family status standard prior to DOMA that applied to
all federal benefits or protections.
106. Villazor, supra note 102, at 1366.
107. Id. at 1367.
108. Collins, supra note 101.
109. Id. at 2175 (“Nevertheless, a closer examination of these cases helps underscore that,
in the hands of administrative officials charged with gatekeeping for the American polity,
domestic relations laws could be, and were, used to further the racially nativist policies of
contemporary nationality law.”).
110. Id. at 2180.
111. On their face, the examples documented by Villazor, supra note 102, and Collins,
supra note 101, could be seen as undercutting the conventional narrative in that they document
examples of federal involvement in family status. On the other hand, by documenting
discriminatory federal involvement, these histories simultaneously support the conventional
narrative’s wariness of federal intervention in family law generally or in family status
determinations specifically.
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Moreover, because the limited existing scholarship on family status determinations
focuses on individual federal programs, it does not provide a sense of the extent of
federal involvement.112 Has the federal government’s involvement been limited to a
few isolated programs? Or was its involvement more pervasive?
Using children as the lens, this Part addresses both issues. This Article focuses on
the family status of child, both because federal involvement in this area has been
particularly extensive113 and because examination of these efforts has been
overlooked. Specifically, this Part documents a few of the many federal programs
that include federal definitions of child that do not track or at least are not limited to
state family status rules. Moreover, in many (although not all) of these programs, the
purpose of adding these additional federal definitions was to extend protections to
people who, in the assessment of the federal government, would be unfairly denied
benefits if the program deferred to state family status definitions.
To understand the history of federal involvement in the family status of child, it
is necessary to have at least a basic understanding of state family law. For one not
immersed in family law, the determination of who is a child may seem obvious. But
throughout American history, the status of child has been heavily contested, at least
for some groups of children.114 It is also important to note that the determination that
one is a child can have immense implications.115 Thus, the status may determine
whether a minor has a right to maintain a relationship with his or her parent,116 the

112. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 101; Villazor, supra note 102.
113. To be clear, although the federal government arguably has been more involved in
determining the family status of child than it has been with regard to other family statuses, its
involvement has not been limited to that issue. For example, during and after the Civil War,
the federal government took steps to recognize the intimate adult relationships between former
slaves, even when these relationships were not recognized by the states. See, e.g., W. Burlette
Carter, The “Federal Law of Marriage”: Deference, Deviation, and DOMA, 21 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 705, 728 (2013). More recently, prior to the demise of section 3 of
DOMA, the federal government took a number of steps to extend benefits to the same-sex
partners of federal employees and service members, even when these relationships were not
recognized as a matter of state law. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Berry, Director of U.S.
Office of Pers. Mgmt. to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (June 2, 2010), available at http://
www.chcoc.gov/Transmittals/TransmittalDetails.aspx?TransmittalId=2982.
114. In the past, husbands were almost always considered the legal parents of the children
born to their wives. See, e.g., Joslin, supra note 24, at 1491–92 (discussing the strength of the
marital presumption historically). Thus, historically, most of the controversy regarding the
child status concerned nonmarital children. See generally, e.g., Maldonado, supra note 23
(discussing the legal treatment of nonmarital children). Today, with the advent and greater use
of DNA testing, as well as reproductive technology, questions and controversy regarding the
child status are no longer confined to the context of nonmarital children. Courtney G. Joslin,
Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and
Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 607–16 (2009); see also June Carbone, The Legal Definition of
Parenthood: Uncertainty at the Core of Family Identity, 65 LA. L. REV. 1295, 1295 (2005)
(“The definition of parentage—and with it the determination of which adults receive legal
recognition in children’s lives—has become the most contentious issue in family law.”).
115. See Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent
Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 34 (2010) (listing harms a child
may experience if he or she lacks a legally recognized parent-child relationship).
116. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting the
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minor is entitled to inherit intestate through a particular adult,117 the minor is entitled
to child support from a particular adult,118 or the minor is entitled to a vast array of
both state and federal benefits intended to help minors in the event of the death or
disability of his or her parent.119
Throughout most of our history, state rules treated children born outside of
marriage very harshly.120 Under the common law, children born to unmarried women
were filius nullius—literally the child of no one.121 At common law, a nonmarital
father had no legal relationship with his biological child, even if his biological
parentage was clear and uncontested.122 Indeed, at common law, biological mothers
also lacked parental rights.123 By the late nineteenth century, these rules had been
modified to extend legally recognized parent-child relationships to nonmarital
mothers.124 But through the late twentieth century, many states continued to
discriminate against nonmarital children with regard to their rights by and through their
fathers. For example, in 1966, many states still permitted a nonmarital child to inherit
through his father only if the father married the child’s mother.125 In these jurisdictions,
intestacy rights were denied even if the man admitted he was the father and, in many
states, even if the man was under court order to pay for the child’s support.126

visitation claim brought by a woman who was not considered the child’s legal parent as a
matter of state law).
117. See Courtney G. Joslin, Protecting Children(?): Marriage, Gender, and Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1211 (2010) (“For the most part, a child
is not entitled to intestate succession unless he or she has a legally recognized parent-child
relationship with the decedent.”).
118. See id. at 1198–1209 (discussing how children may be denied child support through
persons who are not considered legal parents).
119. See id.
120. See Maldonado, supra note 23, at 346 (“No one would dispute that for most of U.S. history,
‘illegitimate’ children suffered significant legal and societal discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
121. Id. at 350.
122. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 197–98, 234–36 (G. Edward White ed., 1988); Mary L.
Shanley, Unwed Fathers’ Rights, Adoption, and Sex Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the
Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 60, 67 (1995) (“Under the common law a man
had . . . no legal relationship at all to children he sired out of wedlock.”).
123. Today, of course, it is possible for a woman to give birth to a genetically unrelated child
through the use of in vitro fertilization (IVF). See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family:
Reproductive Transformations, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 37, 38 n.4 (1995). But IVF has only
been possible since the late twentieth century. Theresa Glennon, Choosing One: Resolving the
Epidemic of Multiples in Assisted Reproduction, 55 VILL. L. REV. 147, 198 (2010).
124. See Martha F. Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56 RUTGERS
L. REV. 73, 81 (2003) (noting that “by the late nineteenth century, mothers were generally
accorded a formal legal connection to their out-of-wedlock children”).
125. See HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 26 (1971) (“In most
states, however, the illegitimate child still cannot inherit from his father, other than by will.”);
id. at 19 (“[M]ost states permit full legitimation to be accomplished through the marriage of
the parents of the illegitimate child, although numerous states even then require a specific
acknowledgement.”).
126. In Labine v. Vincent, for example, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the child at
issue would have been entitled to federal Social Security and veterans benefits even though
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Many (although not all)127 federal benefits programs incorporate state definitions of
child as one means of establishing eligibility for some federal children’s benefit. For
example, when children were added as beneficiaries to the Social Security Act in 1939,
the primary way to establish eligibility as a child was by reference to state family status
standards—specifically the right to inherit intestate under state probate law.128 Many
other federal benefits programs likewise incorporate state intestacy standards.129
But as Kristin Collins shows, federal officials have not always deferred to state
family status rules regarding children: In citizenship determinations, federal officials
sometimes declined to extend children’s benefits to persons who would have been
considered children as a matter of state law.130 Specifically, when children born
abroad would have been considered “legitimate” under the relevant state standards,
federal immigration officials sometimes disregarded these rules in cases involving
mixed-race or nonwhite children.131

she would not have been entitled to intestate succession through her father under Louisiana
law. 401 U.S. 532, 535 n.3 (1971). In Labine, the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
Louisiana statutory scheme was constitutional. Id. at 539–40.
127. An example of a scheme that arguably does not defer to or incorporate state family
status standards regarding children at all is the Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)
(defining a “person’s ‘children’” to mean “that person’s immediate offspring, whether
legitimate or not, and any children legally adopted by that person”). This is ironic given that
the Supreme Court’s decision interpreting child in an earlier version of the Act is often cited
to support the proposition that the federal government always defers to state family status
determinations. See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
128. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, §209(m), 53 Stat.
1360, 1378 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)) (providing that a person
is entitled to child’s Social Security benefits if he or she “would have the same status relative
to taking intestate personal property as a . . . child”); see also Joslin, supra note 24, at 1488
(“Under the original 1939 amendments [to the Social Security Act], the primary way a child
could demonstrate eligibility was by showing she was entitled to intestate succession as a child
under state intestacy law.”). It is important to note, however, that even in 1939, the Social
Security Act included one independent federal eligibility standard. The Act provided that a
child was eligible for children’s Social Security benefits if the child was born to a couple
whose marriage was later declared to be void. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) (2012) (providing that
a child is eligible for Title II benefits if, before the child was born, the “insured individual and
the mother or father . . . went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported marriage
between them which, but for a legal impediment . . . would have been a valid marriage”).
Today, most if not all states would treat such a child as a “legitimate” child of the couple under
state family and probate law, but this was not true in many states in 1939. See ERNST FREUND,
ILLEGITIMACY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 13 (1919)
(noting that “[l]egislation legitimating the issue of void or annulled marriages is common in
America”); KRAUSE, supra note 125, at 11 (“Whereas the offspring of a defective marriage,
annulled with ab initio effect, used to be illegitimate, a number of states today give legitimate
status to the child of almost any alliance that resembles a formal marriage.”).
129. See, e.g., 45 U.S.C. § 231e(a)(7) (2012) (lump sum payments under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974); 20 C.F.R. § 725.220(d) (2014) (claims for benefits under the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act); 20 C.F.R. § 222.32(a) (2014) (claims for family-based benefits
under the Railroad Retirement Act).
130. Collins, supra note 101, at 2187.
131. Id. at 2187 (arguing that federal officials “sometimes borrowed, sometimes ignored,
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This type of example—where the federal government refused to defer to state family
status rules in order to deny federal family-based benefits—is not the only type of
federal involvement in family status determinations. Indeed, when one looks
specifically at federal benefits targeted at children, one can find numerous examples of
federal laws and programs that either do not incorporate state family status rules at all,
or include more inclusive, independent federal definitions. And in many circumstances,
these independent federal definitions of child were deliberately added in order to
mitigate the effects of state laws that discriminated against nonmarital children.132
1. Federal Legislative Efforts
The definitions of child in federal law are varied. As noted above, many federal
statutes and regulations do continue to defer to and incorporate state law, at least in
part.133 But some do not explicitly refer to state family status rules at all.134
Some of the federal programs included independent federal definitions of “child”
from their inception.135 Other federal programs initially incorporated only state
standards but were later amended to include additional, more inclusive federal
standards.136 In at least some instances, the available evidence suggests that federal
officials chose to incorporate independent federal definitions of “child” after finding
that reliance solely on state standards produced unfair results.137 In other instances,
federal officials concluded that it was important to have a uniform federal standard
that did not vary depending on what state a person was from.138
With regard to some federal programs, Congress decided very early on to be more
inclusive of nonmarital children than was the case under prevailing state standards at
the time. For example, in 1917, Congress amended the War Risk Insurance Act.139

and often adapted domestic relations law principles from state law or general law sources . . .
in response to the pressure created by particular [racially nativist] policy objectives”).
132. See Note, The Rights of Illegitimates Under Federal Statutes, 76 HARV. L. REV. 337,
341 (1962) (Adopting state laws of descent for purposes of establishing eligibility for federal
benefits has resulted in “a great majority of illegitimate children cannot obtain benefits upon
the death or disability of their fathers; this is so even when those same children were entitled
by state law to receive full support from the father while he was able to provide it.”).
133. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012); Railroad Retirement
Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. § 231e(a)(7) (2012); Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(b)(1)(C) (2014).
134. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8341(a)(4) (2012) (describing survivor annuities for civil service
members); Civil Liberties Act Redress Provision, 28 C.F.R. § 74.2(d) (2013); Retired Federal
Employees Health Benefits, 5 C.F.R. § 891.102 (2014).
135. See infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 145–55 and accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 151–55 and accompanying text.
138. As one federal advisory group put it, with regard to programs that are national in
scope, whether a particular person is entitled to critical benefits “should not depend on . . . the
laws of the State in which the person happens to live.” 1965 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC.,
PART 3: IMPROVEMENTS IN THE CASH-BENEFIT PROVISIONS, available at http://www.ssa.gov
/history/reports/65council/65part3.html.
139. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-90, § 22, 40 Stat. 398, 401. For a comprehensive
overview of the modern veterans’ benefits system, see James D. Ridgway, Recovering an
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The Act governed “salary, benefits, and insurance for all American service members
in World War I, along with the treatment of disabled veterans.”140 In the original
enactment of children’s benefits under the Act, the term child was defined by an
entirely independent federal standard, which included some illegitimate children.
Specifically, the Act defined the term child to include, among others, “[a]n
illegitimate child . . . if [the father] acknowledged by instrument in writing signed by
him, or if he has been judicially ordered or decreed to contribute to such child’s
support.”141 Notably, in the vast majority of states at that time, nonmarital children
were considered the children of their fathers under state family law only if the child’s
parents married.142 As a result, under this federal definition, some nonmarital
children were eligible for benefits even though they were not considered children as
a matter of state family law.
A number of federal military benefits programs that were adopted during the same
time period did not incorporate such an expansive definition of child.143 Thus, there
was not a concerted, across-the-board attempt by the federal government to be more
inclusive of nonmarital children.144 But, as the War Risk Insurance Act of 1917
illustrates, Congress, at times, was more protective than the states.
In other instances, Congress initially chose to follow state family status standards
(or simply failed to include definitions at all and the practice became to defer to state
law). But Congress thereafter amended the statutes to include additional, independent
federal standards that were more inclusive of nonmarital children after determining
that solely deferring to state law produced unfair results. For example, the original
provisions of the Social Security Act governing children’s benefits largely, although
not entirely, deferred to state intestacy law.145 But in 1965, drawing upon earlier
federal statutes governing benefits for the family members of veterans,146 Congress

Institutional Memory: The Origins of the Modern Veterans’ Benefits System from 1914 to
1958, 5 VETERANS L. REV. 1, 7–8 (2013).
140. Ridgway, supra note 139, at 8.
141. § 22, 40 Stat. at 401.
142. For example, writing in 1919, Professor Ernst Freund found that “most American
States provide for legitimation of illegitimate children by the marriage of the parents, [but]
only a minority of States permit legitimation without such marriage.” FREUND, supra note 128,
at 22. And again, under the law at that time, “the father and the illegitimate child are by the
common law strangers to each other.” Id. at 21–22.
143. See, e.g., Pay Readjustment Act of 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-235, § 4, 42 Stat. 625, 627
(containing no definition of the term “child”).
144. See Collins, supra note 101, at 2188 (describing how federal “officials made
determinations regarding the father-child relationship in different cases for different reasons,
but the very pliability of the definitions of marriage and legitimacy made them useful in the
enforcement of various policy goals, including the nativist aspirations of American nationality
laws at the time”).
145. See Joslin, supra note 24, at 1488 (“Under the original 1939 amendments, the primary
way a child could demonstrate eligibility was by showing she was entitled to intestate
succession as a child under state intestacy law.”); see also Social Security Act Amendments
of 1939, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2012)) (providing that a person is entitled to child’s Social
Security benefits if he or she “would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal
property as a . . . child”).
146. 1965 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 138 (noting that there were earlier
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amended the Social Security Act to include additional means of establishing eligibility
for children’s Social Security benefits. And notably, while these additional standards
drew from state law, they were not dependent upon state law or the state in which the
child or the insured resided.147 Specifically, Congress permitted nonmarital children to
establish eligibility for children’s Social Security benefits if the insured had
acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his or her son or daughter,
. . . been decreed by a court to be the mother or father of the applicant, . .
. been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant
because the applicant [was] his or her son or daughter, . . . or . . . [was]
shown by evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social Security
to [have been] the mother or father of the applicant.148
In some states at this time, one or more of these acts would be sufficient to enable
the nonmarital child to inherit through his father; but, even in 1965, it remained the
case in some states that nothing short of marriage to the child’s mother would
suffice.149 Thus, by adopting these eligibility standards across the board without
regard to the law in the child’s or the father’s domicile, some children were eligible
for Social Security benefits through their fathers even though they were not
considered their fathers’ children as a matter of state law.150
With regard to the 1965 amendments of the Social Security Act, the legislative
history makes clear that the decision to override state law and adopt a uniform, more
inclusive federal definition of child was deliberate. After studying the issue, the 1965
Advisory Council on Social Security stated that the then-existing definition in the
Social Security Act, which relied almost exclusively on state family status standards,
excluded some clearly deserving children from eligibility.151 To resolve this unfairness,
the Advisory Council recommended adding some independent federal family status

examples of federal acts that extended benefits to “children who [did] not meet the definition
of ‘child’ under State law”); see also Act of Sept. 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-857, § 101(4), 72
Stat. 1105, 1106 (defining “child”).
147. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 339(a), 79 Stat. 286,
40910 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i) (2012)); see also Joslin, supra note
24, at 1488–89.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C) (2012).
149. See KRAUSE, supra note 125, at 19–20; see also S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 109–10 (1965),
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2049–50 (“The States differ considerably in the
requirements that must be met in order for a child born out of wedlock to have inheritance rights.
In some States a child whose parents never married can inherit property just as if they had
married; in others such a child can inherit property as the child of the man only if he was
acknowledged or decreed to be the man’s child in accordance with requirements specified in the
State law; and in several States a child whose parents never married cannot inherit his father’s
intestate property under any circumstances.”); FREUND, supra note 128, at 22 (“While most
American states provide for legitimation of illegitimate children by the marriage of the parents,
only a minority of States permit legitimation without such marriage.”).
150. See supra note 126.
151. 1965 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 138 (concluding that because the
program is national in scope, eligibility should not be dependent on whether the child would
be protected as a matter of state law).
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standards to the Act.152 Moreover, federal officials clearly understood that in doing so,
they were establishing and adopting a federal standard of who qualified as a child.153
As the Advisory Council explained:
The social security program is national in scope . . . and the program is
intended to pay benefits as a partial replacement of lost support to those
relatives of the worker who normally look to him for support. The
Council believes that in such a program whether a child gets benefits on
the earnings record of a person who has been determined to be his father
and who has an obligation to support him should not depend on whether
he can inherit that person’s intestate personal property under the laws
of the State in which the person happens to live.154
Congress ultimately accepted the Council’s recommendation. As a result of the
addition of these new federal standards, some people who were not considered
children as a matter of state intestacy law were entitled to children’s Social Security
benefits.155 To be clear, although there was a growing concern at the time about the
legal treatment of nonmarital children,156 greater protection was yet mandated as a
matter of constitutional law.157 It was not until three years later—in 1968—that the
Supreme Court issued the first in a series of decisions striking down state laws that

152. Id.
153. See Recent Development, Illegitimates: Definition of “Children” Under Federal
Welfare Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 989–90 (1967) (“Congress seems to have
recognized recently the irrationality of referring to restrictive state law under a statutory
scheme designed to benefit dependents. . . . The legislative history of the [1965] amendments
indicates a congressional belief that, in a program designed to benefit children handicapped
by the loss of a father’s earning capacity, a child’s recovery ‘should not depend on whether he
can inherit his father’s intestate personal property under the laws of the state in which the
father happens to live.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 110 (1965))).
154. 1965 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 138 (emphasis added); see also 1965
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/65council/65summary.html (“A child should be
paid benefits based on his father’s earnings without regard to whether he has the status of a child
under State inheritance laws if the father was supporting the child or had a legal obligation to do
so.”); S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 110 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2050 (“The
committee believes that in a national program that is intended to pay benefits to replace the support
lost by a child when his father retires, dies, or becomes disabled, whether a child gets benefits should
not depend on whether he can inherit his father’s intestate personal property under the laws of the
State in which his father happens to live.”).
155. See supra note 126.
156. See Harry D. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Society—A Proposed
Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEX. L. REV. 829, 830 (1966) (“Progressive legislation has
sought to abolish the concept of illegitimacy to the extent that it disadvantages the child of
known parents.”).
157. See Laurence C. Nolan, “Unwed Children” and Their Parents Before the United
States Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H.: Unlikely Participants in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1999) (“Between 1968 and 1989, the United States
Supreme Court decided more than thirty cases involving unwed parents and their children.”).
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discriminated against illegitimate children.158
As is true with the Social Security Act, some military benefits programs initially
were less inclusive of nonmarital children. But again, in some instances, Congress
later recognized the unfairness of using only state law definitions of child and added
independent, more inclusive federal definitions. In 1971, for example, Congress
amended the Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance (SGLI) program to be more
(although not fully) inclusive of nonmarital children.159 SGLI is a low-cost insurance
program for, among others, active duty members of the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines, and Coast Guard.160 Initially, the provisions governing the program did “not
define the terms widow, widower, child, or parent for SGLI purposes, thus
presumably leaving such definitions to local State law.”161 Over time, however,
Congress concluded that relying on state law resulted in the denial of benefits to
some children who were deserving of the protection of the program. Moreover, as
the Social Security Advisory Council concluded,162 Congress determined that relying
on state definitions resulted in unfair results; a child’s eligibility may depend on
which state’s law applied. This, Congress determined, was inappropriate. As
explained in the Senate Report, “The greatest need for uniformity is in the area of
children and parents.”163 To remedy this unfairness, Congress replaced a rule that
deferred to the relevant state’s definition of child to an independent and uniform
federal definition.164 This new federal definition drew upon various states’
definitions,165 but whether a particular child was eligible did not depend on whether
the child or the father was living in one of the states that followed these standards.166

158. See Maldonado, supra note 23, at 351–52 (“Starting in 1968, the Court recognized that
‘illegitimate children . . . are clearly “persons” within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause’
and later held that it is ‘illogical and unjust’ to punish children for their parents’ actions. In a
series of decisions over the next twenty years, the Court struck down numerous laws denying
nonmarital children many of the rights available to marital children, including the right to
damages for the wrongful death of a parent, the right to paternal support, intestate succession,
and government benefits.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)).
159. Act of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-185, 85 Stat. 642 (codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1965(8) (2012)).
160. Servicemembers Group Life Insurance (SGLI), U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,
http://benefits.va.gov/insurance/sgli.asp.
161. S. REP. NO. 92-545, at 1 (1971).
162. 1965 ADVISORY COUNCIL ON SOC. SEC., supra note 138.
163. S. REP. NO. 92-545, at 2.
164. Id. (“[T]here should be . . . uniformity in determining the appropriate beneficiaries
under that program.”); see also Pub. L. No. 92-185, 85 Stat. 642 (codified at 38 U.S.C.
§ 1965(8) (2012)) (defining the term “child”).
165. S. REP. NO. 92-545, at 2 (adopting “the most widely accepted criteria established by
State law and the judicial precedents for establishing that an illegitimate child is the child of
his alleged father”).
166. Among other standards, a person would be considered a child for purposes of
Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance if “proof of paternity is established from service
department . . . records . . . which show that with his knowledge the insured was named as the
father of the child.” Act of Dec. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-185, 85 Stat. 642 (codified at 38
U.S.C. § 1965(8) (2012)).
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The Copyright Act is another federal program that was later amended to include
an independent federal definition of child. The Copyright Act ironically is a federal
law that is often cited to support the conventional narrative that family status
determinations are matters exclusively reserved to the states. Numerous briefs and
law review articles cite the copyright case De Sylva v. Ballentine167 for this
proposition. For example, in their Brief to the Supreme Court, the Federalism
Scholars asserted that the Supreme Court in De Sylva relied on the principle that
“determining family status remains a State power.”168
While it is true that the Court did defer to state family status rules in De Sylva, it did
so because the statute at that time did not contain a definition of child or children.169
But a more complete history of the Copyright Act actually undermines the conventional
narrative. In 1976, twenty years after the Court’s De Sylva decision, Congress amended
the Copyright Act to include an independent federal definition of children.170
Moreover, these federal definitions of child are not a thing of the past. Many of
the federal definitions discussed herein are still in effect today.171 And it is not just
that we continue to feel the effects of long-ago enacted provisions. On the contrary,
new federal definitions of child continue to be drafted by Congress and enacted into
law. For example, when Congress enacted the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, it
included a very broad definition of child.172 Specifically, the statute defines “son or
daughter” to include the “child of a person standing in loco parentis” even if that
parent-child relationship is not recognized as a matter of state law.173
In sum, while many federal statutes do in fact defer solely or primarily to state family
status rules,174 there are many that do not; many federal statutes contain independent

167. 351 U.S. 570 (1956).
168. Federalism Scholars’ Brief, supra note 12, at 27–28.
169. De Sylva, 351 U.S. at 580 (noting that under the “general scheme of the statute,”
Congress must look to state law to determine whether various family relationships exist).
170. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101–810 (2012)) (defining “a person’s children” to mean a “person’s immediate offspring,
whether legitimate or not, and any children legally adopted by that person”); cf. Recent
Development, supra note 153, at 987–88 (“The De Sylva decision is often cited for the
proposition that state intestacy law must be consulted in construing the term ‘children’ in an
act of Congress. Many courts have accepted this doctrine; in all but one of the recent cases,
however, the state law treated illegitimates as ‘children’ for purposes of intestacy. Where
reference to state law would deny benefits to the illegitimate child, the lower federal courts
have often departed from the strictures of the De Sylva rule. Middleton v. Luckenbach
Steamship Co., for example, espoused an independent standard permitting illegitimates to
recover under the Death on the High Seas Act.” (footnotes omitted)).
171. To name just two, the Social Security Act still contains a number of independent
federal definitions of child, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(2)–(3) (2012), as does the Copyright Act,
see 17 U.S.C. § 101.
172. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012)); see
also Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 407–08 (2008) (discussing the scope of the
child definition and arguing that it is not broad enough).
173. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12). The term “in loco parentis” includes “those with day-to-day
responsibilities to care for and financially support a child.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(c)(3) (2007).
174. See supra notes 127–29 and accompanying text.
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federal family status definitions.175 And, particularly with regard to children, in many
instances, Congress intentionally added independent federal definitions in order to
mitigate the effects of discriminatory state laws.
2. Federal Judicial Efforts
The federal legislative branch was not alone in adopting and applying independent
federal definitions of family status. This was certainly not the majority rule, but in a
range of cases interpreting a number of different federal statutes, courts declared that
the word child need not be interpreted consistent with state law.
This was and remains true, for example, under the Longshoremen’s and
Harborworker’s Compensation Act (LHWCA), which “provides employment-injury
and occupational-disease protection” to workers injured as a result of their work on
“navigable waters of the United States, or in adjoining areas.”176 In assessing whether
a particular person was a child within the meaning of the LHWCA, the Ninth Circuit
declared in Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Marshall that it need not be “influenced by
provisions of state law.”177 In Weyerhaeuser, the court concluded that the minor was
a child within the meaning of the federal statute and therefore entitled to benefits
even though the minor would not have been considered a child under Washington
state law.178 The court’s holding in Weyerhaeuser, that eligibility under the LHWCA
is not dependent upon one’s status as a child under state law, remains good law.179
As the Fifth Circuit explained in a more recent case applying the statute:
Application of rigorous state law schemes for proof of paternity,
designed to serve various state interests such as the orderly devolution of
property, especially immovable property, is inconsistent with the history
and tradition of liberal administration of benefits under the LHWCA.180
The court continued, “While state law may prove helpful in that a child under state
law would likely be a child under the LHWCA, the converse would not necessarily
follow.”181

175. See supra note 134.
176. The Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-lhwca.htm.
177. 102 F.2d 78, 81 (9th Cir. 1939) (The Act, the court explained, “provided all definitions
necessary to the determination of whether claimant is a ‘child’ and its authority being
paramount and exclusive as to the subjects on which it has legislated, it is not allowable to go
beyond the Act provisions. Consequently we hold that claimant was a ‘child’ entitled to
recovery of compensation.”).
178. Id.
179. For example, the Longshore Deskbook, published by the U.S. Department of Labor,
explains, “It is not necessary to look to state law to define these terms [related to the term
‘child’]. As the definition in the federal statute is complete, it controls.” U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
LONGSHORE DESKBOOK, pt. IV, at 22–23 (2014), available at http://www.dol.gov/brb
/References/Reference_works/lhca/lsdesk/DBMISC.pdf.
180. St. John Stevedoring Co. v. Wilfred, 818 F.2d 397, 399 (5th Cir. 1987).
181. Id.
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Similarly, in a series of cases applying the Death on the High Seas Act, federal courts
declared that they need not look to state law to determine whether a particular person
was a child within the meaning of the Act. Eligibility should not be based on state law,
the courts explained, because this “would result in diversity and lack of uniformity” with
regard to who is eligible under the provisions.182 Or, to use the words of the Second
Circuit, “To allow the law of the state of the decedent’s domicile to prevail would permit
and deny for the same accident a right of recovery to relatives who were similarly related
to persons killed because of residence in different jurisdictions. . . .”183 Such a result, the
court continued, would be contrary to the purpose of the statute, which was to “continue
the support of dependents after a casualty.”184
C. Federal Efforts To Shape State Family Status Determinations
In the sections above, I document examples in which the federal government
extended federal benefits to people not considered to be legal family members under
state law. But federal involvement in family status determinations is not limited
solely to the distribution of federal benefits. Recent years have also seen numerous
examples of federal attempts to shape state family status rules themselves, including
rules governing the determination of child status.
As others have documented, the federal government began to take a more active
role in child support enforcement in the 1970s. In 1974, for example, Congress added
Title IV-D to the Social Security Act.185 Among other things, these new provisions
required all states to establish child support enforcement programs as a condition of
designated federal funding.186 “Since 1974, Congress has returned repeatedly to this
subject. . . .”187 In particular, federal law now requires (among other things) all states
to have and implement guidelines for setting child support amounts, to have certain
child support enforcement mechanisms in place, and to recognize and enforce
out-of-state child support orders.188
This federal involvement has not been limited to procedural or administrative
rules with respect to child support collection. To the contrary, the federal
government has increasingly taken steps to shape state laws regarding who is a
child and who is a parent.189

182. Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1934).
183. Id. at 329.
184. Id. at 330.
185. Social Security Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–665 (2012)).
186. Ann Laquer Estin, Federalism and Child Support, 5 VA. J. SOC. P OL’Y & L. 541,
542 (1998).
187. Estin, supra note 35, at 284.
188. Id.
189. See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Distrust: Reexamining the
Regulation of Genetic Identity 34 (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory
Research
Paper
Series,
Paper
No.
2014-41,
2014),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2473728 (noting that the federal
government has “condition[ed] federal funding on the adoption of particular state family law
rules”).
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Historically, state parentage rules relied primarily on marriage as a basis for
assigning legal parentage.190 Outside of the marital context, there were some bases for
assigning parentage to nonmarital fathers.191 This was true due in part to the fact that,
until recently, “there was no way to determine a man’s parentage with any degree of
certainty.”192 In the last few decades, however, accurate and relatively inexpensive
DNA testing has become widely available.193 But “[j]ust about the time when states
had the opportunity to decide what role newly-available DNA testing should play in
parentage determinations, the federal government intervened,” hamstringing its
choices.194 Over the past four decades or so, Congress passed “a series of acts that
increasingly conditioned states’ receipt of welfare funds to the identification of genetic
fathers”195 and, in turn, the assignment of legal parentage to them.
For example, in the 1974 amendments to the Social Security Act, Congress
required unwed mothers seeking welfare benefits to participate in the process of
identifying the child’s genetic father and establishing his paternity and child
support obligations.196 In 1988, Congress enacted the Family Support Act of
1988,197 which allowed for genetic testing in paternity cases,198 and “required that
each state establish a minimum number of paternity declarations or face financial
penalties.”199
Another way in which the federal government has shaped the substance of state
parentage rules is by mandating that states adopt voluntary acknowledgement of
paternity (VAP) programs.200 “[S]tarting in the 1990s, Congress passed a series of
statutes that require states to adopt a simple, administrative registration system

190. See NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD, 133 (2000) (“[B]iological
fatherhood was never sufficient to establish fatherhood in the past. Marriage was the key status
for defining fatherhood.”); Katharine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and
Future of Paternity Law and Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 22 (2004)
(“For most of western history, marriage, not blood, determined fatherhood.”).
191. See Davis, supra note 124, at 82 (“But while illegitimate children gained a formal
connection to their mothers, non-marital fathers remained free of the legal burdens and
benefits of parenthood. Though more solicitous of children’s plight than the earlier British
common law, the American system perpetuated the discriminatory regime of illegitimacy,
since both the child and father were typically barred from gaining any benefit from the paternal
relationship . . . absent an act of formal legitimation.”).
192. Joslin, supra note 114, at 603.
193. Id. at 604.
194. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 189, at 36.
195. Id.
196. 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2012); see also Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Fatherhood: Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 325, 345 (2005) (noting that the Act requires “welfare recipients . . . to cooperate
in identifying the noncustodial parent”).
197. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(B)(i) (2012) (corresponds to Family Support Act of 1988,
§ 111(b)(2), 102 Stat. 2343, 2349).
199. Murphy, supra note 196, at 346.
200. Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for Same-Sex Couples,
20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 469 (2012).
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establishing the legal parentage of children born to unmarried women.”201 A VAP is
essentially a form signed by the woman and the man alleged to the child’s father; if
the form is properly filled out, filed, and not rescinded, federal law provides that it
establishes the legal paternity of the man.202 Although the provisions are part of state
family law parentage schemes, VAPs are a “creature of federal . . . law.”203
Through these and other provisions, federal law directly impacted state family
status rules. As Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett argue, “Had Congress not
exercised its federal muscle, states quite likely would have developed . . . different
approaches to establishing parentage than they currently do.”204
III. PLACING FAMILIES IN THE FEDERALISM DISCUSSION
Perhaps one of the reasons that the myth of family law federalism is so resilient
is that it appears to make things easier. One knows which level of government is
supposed to act when it comes to matters of the family—the states. Once the myth of
family law’s inherent localism is dispelled, one is then left with a set of more
complicated questions that, to date, have largely been overlooked.205 If Congress is
not precluded from acting, should it act, and if so, when and how?
When questions of federal involvement in family law are considered, the analysis
largely focuses on the boundaries of Congress’s power.206 This focus on structural
limitations obscures not only a long history of federal involvement, but also
consideration of these underlying normative questions.207 As Rena Steinzor explains,
the focus on whether there is an across-the-board limit to Congress’s power distracts
commentators and policymakers from grappling with “the appropriate question:
whether there are compelling reasons why a particular level of government is best
suited to grapple with a specific problem.”208
Just because the federal government is not completely precluded from making
family status determinations does not mean that the federal government has
unlimited powers in this area. Congress, of course, must act in ways “that [are]

201. Joslin, supra note 115, at 44.
202. Harris, supra note 200, at 475.
203. Id.
204. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 189, at 42.
205. There is a small body of scholarship engaging these questions. See generally, e.g.,
Estin, supra note 35; Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 37.
206. See generally, e.g., Ernest A. Young & Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty, and
Equality in United States v. Windsor, CATO SUP. CT. REV., 2012–2013, at 117.
207. Estin, supra note 35, at 271 (noting that “the federalism tropes that pervade our political
and judicial discourse” about family law have obscured more careful analysis of these questions).
Of course, family law is not the only area of law in which invocations of federalism are used to
avoid grappling with more difficult normative questions. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 36,
at 534 (“[T]he critical question is: When is it necessary or preferable to regulate at the national
level rather than on a decentralized basis? Unfortunately, too often careful analysis has been
absent and federalism has been used as a slogan or as a guise to hide the real issue in dispute. For
example, during the debate over civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s, opponents talked about
federalism and states’ rights rather than the real issue: racial equality.”).
208. Steinzor, supra note 88, at 131.
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rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”209
That said, contrary to the conventional narrative, Congress’s discretion here is quite
wide.210 First, Congress certainly can, and long has, decided who are family members
for purposes of federal benefits (or the imposition of federal obligations). Moreover,
as described in Part II.C, at times the federal government has shaped some state
family status rules.
Turning back to the normative questions, this Article does not offer a simple
rubric for answering them. It does, however, provide a set of values or factors that
should guide the assessment of when and how the federal government should
participate in the realm of family status determinations.
These factors draw from the work of federalism scholars. These scholars identify
a number of values associated with local action on the one hand and with federal or
centralized action on the other.211 Other academics apply these values to a range of
specific substantive areas of law.212 For example, even though immigration is
historically understood as a federal issue, there is a burgeoning body of literature
examining the role of the state and local governments in that area.213 However,
because “the family and its law are deemed, either descriptively or normatively, to
be special,”214 family law has largely been absent from this discussion. This Part
bridges the family law exceptionalism divide by bringing family law into this
important conversation.

209. United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010).
210. To be clear, it is certainly true that the definition of spouse in DOMA differs in critical
respects from the examples discussed above. None of the federal family status standards
discussed above apply across all federal benefits schemes. Indeed, some of the federal family
status definitions examined herein apply to only one particular benefit. That said, some of the
federal definitions of child discussed above are used across a fairly broad range of federal
benefits programs. For example, in the military and veterans benefits contexts, some federal
definitions of child apply across a range of military and veterans benefits programs. See Joslin,
supra note 24, at 1504 (noting that in 1929, Congress adopted a definition of child for purposes
of a number of military benefits provisions and that this definition, “as slightly broadened in
1942, [has] since been carried over into a range of federal military and veterans’ benefits
provisions” (footnote omitted)); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 681 n.6
(1973) (noting that the housing provisions of the Career Compensation Act of 1949 “retained
in substance the dependency definitions of §4 of the Pay Readjustment Act of 1942 (56 Stat.
361)” and that “this provision was itself derived from unspecified earlier enactments”).
211. See Huntington, supra note 30, at 827 (“[The federalism] debate has yielded certain
core values that scholars and courts use to try to answer questions of institutional structure and
allocation of authority.”). See generally, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 36 (discussing the
values associated with federalism).
212. See supra notes 30–32.
213. See supra note 30.
214. Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative Family Law:
Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
753, 753 (2010); see also HASDAY, supra note 34, at 15 (observing that “‘family law’ can be
thought of as a system of exemptions from the everyday rules that would apply to interactions
among people in a non-family context” (quoting Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for
Family Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1207, 1207 (1999))).
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A. The Values of Federalism: For and Against
To begin this engagement, this Subpart provides an overview of the values of
local or state assertions of power on the one hand,215 and of federal action or
“centralization” on the other. Then I apply these interests to the issue of family status
determinations.
An important factor favoring local or more decentralized action is
experimentation.216 Allowing states to act, rather than the federal government, can
foster innovation because there are more actors.217 In addition, because any decision
impacts a smaller portion of the overall population, state or local governments may
be more likely to try out new ideas or solutions. As Justice Brandeis once said, “It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may,
if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”218 Local action can also result in
competitive innovation since there are fifty jurisdictions competing for citizens.219
And this competition can produce a number of positive benefits including efficiency
and effectiveness.220
At times, this experimentation may further individual liberties,221 which is another
important value that should be considered. As Erwin Chemerinsky explains,
“Federalism is most likely to enhance liberty when state governments are expanding
the scope of individual rights beyond those protected by the federal government.”222
And because state governments and their decisions are (arguably) more reflective of
the local population,223 state action promotes a sense of community and community
buy-in.224 In this way, localism can “enhance[] democratic rule by providing

215. See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2213–14 (1998) (noting that asserted values of state or
local action include: “increasing opportunities for political participation; maximizing choice
and utility through state or local government competition and citizens’ rights of exit;
maintaining opportunities for creation or preservation of diverse cultures; providing
opportunities for experiment and beneficial innovation; maintaining the possibility of checks
on oppression by the federal government; and enhancing personal and group liberty or
empowerment, by providing multiple layers of government to which citizens may appeal”
(footnotes omitted)).
216. Huntington, supra note 30, at 827; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 525 (describing
one of the values of federalism as “allowing states to be laboratories for new ideas”).
217. See Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, and the
Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 97 (2002) (“Admirers of federalism
often point to the autonomy accorded to the states as a source of beneficial creativity and
experimentation.”).
218. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
219. Goldfarb, supra note 217, at 101–05 (noting the value of competition).
220. See Huntington, supra note 30, at 827.
221. See SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM 387 (1993).
222. Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 538.
223. Goldfarb, supra note 217, at 99–100 (noting that local laws may better “reflect
. . . local conditions and culture”).
224. See BEER, supra note 221, at 386.
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government that is closer to the people.”225 Some argue that when government is closer
to the people,226 citizens are more likely to participate, and, in turn, there is more
“political accountability.”227 This more accountable state government places a “check[]
against national power, protecting both states’ rights and individual rights.”228 It helps
“prevent[] national tyranny,”229 and promote liberty.230
On the other hand, there are other values that can be furthered by national, as
opposed to local, action. Centralization can promote uniformity; there is one set of
rules governing all citizens.231 At times, uniformity is necessary to ensure fairness
and equality.232 And while localism can prevent national tyranny, special interests
can also take over local governments.233 Where this is true, centralized action at the
national level may be necessary to “correct for market imperfections and failures.”234
This national correction may also be necessary when local action thwarts rather than
furthers the goal of protecting individual liberties. Other values of centralized action
can include “speed, coordination, and expertise.”235
B. Applying the Values of Federalism to Family Status Determinations
In thinking about how these values of federalism apply in the context of family
law, there are lessons we can draw from history. One value that is particularly
significant in the context of families is liberty. Questions of family status are
critically important. A person’s status as a child or a spouse may entitle her to a wide
array of important rights and protections.236 People who are “children” generally are

225. Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 525.
226. Goldfarb, supra note 217, at 105–07.
227. Huntington, supra note 30, at 828.
228. Id.; see also Goldfarb, supra note 217, at 107–09.
229. Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 503.
230. See BEER, supra note 221, at 386.
231. Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence,
and Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1845 (2005) (“National
policies are obviously better where uniformity is a prime virtue . . . .”).
232. See Huntington, supra note 30, at 828–29. See generally DAVID L. SHAPIRO,
FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
233. Young, supra note 231, at 1845 (“[N]ational action has been thought to mitigate the
problem of faction in smaller political communities and, in consequence, to provide a good
vehicle for the protection of individual rights.”).
234. Huntington, supra note 30, at 829. See generally SHAPIRO, supra note 232.
235. Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist Approach,
66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 786 (2013); see also Young, supra note 231, at 1845 (noting that “the
national government may also enjoy advantages of administrative efficiency and the
concentration of expertise”).
236. With regard to adult relationships, the federal General Accounting Office identified over
1000 federal rights and responsibilities that are extended to people because they are legal spouses.
Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to Hon. Bill
Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d04353r.pdf; see also Catherine E. Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex
Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1603–08 (2013) (discussing important benefits that a child
may be denied if she lacks a legally recognized parent-child relationship).
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entitled to receive financial support from their parents,237 to receive Social Security
benefits in the event of the death or disability of a parent,238 to inherit intestate
through their parents,239 and to sue for the wrongful death of a parent.240 People who
are considered “spouses” are extended hundreds of protections because they are
spouses.241 Among many other rights, spouses get property protections in the event
of divorce242 or the death of a spouse,243 and the right to access a spouse’s Social
Security benefits in the event of the death or disability of a spouse.244 Moreover,
forming families and having children may be decisions that are important to a
person’s own identity or sense of him or herself. As the Supreme Court has
explained, “[D]ecisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, [and] child rearing”245 are important, indeed, fundamental interests in
part because these decisions concern some of the “most intimate and personal choices
. . . central to personal dignity and autonomy.”246 For these and other reasons, these
issues are of constitutional dimension and import.247
But, as the history described above reminds us, there is no one level of
government that always or best protects these important interests or liberties.248
Despite the deeply held wariness of federal involvement in family law,249 the federal

237. Joslin, supra note 117, at 1198–99 (noting that “in all fifty states, all legal parents—
including nonmarital parents—are required to provide financial support for their children”
(footnote omitted)).
238. Id. at 1210 (noting the various ways a person can establish he or she is entitled to
children’s Social Security benefits).
239. Maldonado, supra note 23, at 357–58 (noting that nonmarital children are entitled to
intestate succession through their fathers if the fathers’ parentage was established).
240. See Joslin, supra note 24, at 1486–99.
241. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003) (“The
benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are enormous, touching nearly every
aspect of life and death. The department states that ‘hundreds of statutes’ are related to
marriage and to marital benefits.”).
242. Laura A. Rosenbury, Two Ways To End a Marriage: Divorce or Death, UTAH L. REV.,
2005, at 1227, 1230 (“Although variations exist among the states, every state’s default approach
is now designed to effectuate an equal or equitable division of all property accumulated from
wages during marriage, regardless of the title of that property.” (footnotes omitted)).
243. Joslin, supra note 52, at 1686 (“[I]n the event that one of the spouses dies prior to
obtaining a divorce, the surviving spouse in almost every state will be entitled to a share of the
deceased’s estate.”).
244. Joslin, supra note 24, at 1488 (“[H]eterosexual spouses are entitled to Social Security
spousal derivative benefits upon certain triggers—death, retirement, or disability of the wage
earner.” (footnote omitted)).
245. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
246. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
247. See id.; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding unconstitutional
Illinois’ failure to recognize and protect a nonmarital father’s relationship with his children).
248. Cf. Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 37, at 417 (“Equality is not an artifact
of the level of a court or of a government body but of who has power within it and what their
commitments are.”).
249. See Patterson, supra note 99, at 399 (“Because family policy is closely connected to
community norms and local social cohesion, such [federal] disruptions can have deleterious
social effects that were neither anticipated nor desired by Congress.”); see also David B. Cruz,
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government has, at times, intervened in the name of greater protection and fairness.
For example, when some states resisted extending greater protection to nonmarital
children, the federal government amended a variety of statutes, including the Social
Security Act,250 to override this state-level discrimination against certain families.251
As Collins and Villazor show us, however, there are contrary examples as well—
instances where the federal government refused to apply and enforce family status rules
in order to further racially discriminatory ends.252 Thus, at times, the states have led the
way, and at other times, federal intervention has been necessary in order to move states
that were slow to act. Policymakers should remain attuned to this value of liberty, but
as the history detailed herein reminds us, no one level of government consistently best
protects this end.253
Experimentalism is also particularly important in the area of family law. Family
law is dynamic.254 Families are constantly changing. More and more families are
forming and living outside of marriage.255 Increasing numbers of families are
blended families.256 There are also many intergenerational families living together.257
Technology is changing as well; it is now possible to create families through in vitro
fertilization and surrogacy.258 And the law needs to adapt to fit these new realities.259

The Defense of Marriage Act and Uncategorical Federalism, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
805, 807 (2011) (critiquing claims that the federal government categorically lacks power to
act in the area of family law and instead offering “a more nuanced, uncategorical approach
relying not on ‘traditional government functions’ analysis but instead on the coincidence of a
number of factors arguably rendering DOMA section 3 improper on federalism grounds”
(footnote omitted)).
250. See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.B.
252. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
253. Cf. Resnik, Categorical Federalism, supra note 37, at 417 (“I am opposed to what I
have termed ‘categorical federalism,’ to rigid equation of any particular level of governance
with a particular set of problems or a particular view of them.” (footnote omitted)).
254. See David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between Legal,
Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 125 (2006) (“For
at least four decades, family law in the United States has been undergoing a most dramatic
transformation.”).
255. See Ann Laquer Estin, Ordinary Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1381, 1384
(2001) (“Statistics show that the number of cohabiting opposite-sex couples has continued to
increase dramatically. . . .”); Marsha Garrison, Nonmarital Cohabitation: Social Revolution and
Legal Regulation, 42 FAM. L.Q. 309, 313 (2008) (“Between 1970 and 2000, the number of U.S.
unmarried-cohabitant households rose almost ten-fold, from 523,000 to 4,880,0000 [sic].”).
256. Robert H. Binstock, Public Policies on Aging in the Twenty-First Century, 9 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 311, 320 (1998) (noting that “[a]lready . . . blended families constitute about
half of all households with children” and that this number will only increase).
257. See Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Intergenerational Relations and the Family Home, 8 LAW
& ETHICS HUM. RTS. 131, 138 (2014) (examining the “increasingly important
multigenerational family”).
258. Joslin, supra note 114, at 602 (“The increasing availability of alternative insemination
and IVF has in turn resulted in greater numbers of families created through surrogacy.”).
259. JOANNE L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 6 (2011) (chronicling the “massive evolution” of family
law in the twentieth century).
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Often, the direction in which family law should go is not simple or entirely clear.
And in these circumstances, local experimentation can be particularly valuable. As
Ann Laquer Estin explains, “Sometimes experimentation is useful in finding policy
solutions to our most difficult family policy problems, and a single national approach
may unduly limit those possibilities.”260
One current example of an issue on which local experimentation arguably is (and
has been) helpful is surrogacy. Currently, the law around the country is mixed on the
issue. “Some states expressly prohibit surrogacy agreements, other states permit
surrogacy in certain, delineated circumstances.”261 Of the states that permit
surrogacy, the rules governing enforceable arrangements vary significantly.262 Some
jurisdictions very tightly regulate the process of surrogacy, requiring court intervention
at multiple points in the process and, for example, requiring a home study of the
intended parents unless waived by the parties.263 Other states that permit surrogacy
impose fewer requirements on the parties involved in the process.264 Given the lack of
consensus about surrogacy generally265 and the best way to regulate it specifically,
there may be significant value in allowing state-level experimentation to play out.266
Another family status issue that may benefit from local experimentation is the
legal status of posthumously born children267—that is, children who are conceived
“after the death of one or both of their genetic parents.”268 States are still grappling
with the questions of whether and under what circumstances posthumously born
children are the legal children of their deceased, biological parent. Many states have
yet to address the issue statutorily.269 In states that have addressed the legal status of

260. Estin, supra note 35, at 334.
261. COURTNEY G. JOSLIN, SHANNON P. MINTER & CATHERINE SAKIMURA, LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 4:1, at 249 (2014).
262. See id. at § 4:2 (describing statutory requirements).
263. See id.
264. The statutory provisions in California and Illinois arguably fall into this category. See id.
265. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009) (describing the political debate about surrogacy).
266. On the other hand, however, given the great number of cases that involve some
interstate component, it also may be an issue on which uniformity of treatment is important if
not critical. See, e.g., Katherine Drabiak, Carole Wegner, Valita Fredland & Paul R. Helft,
Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300,
306 (2007) (arguing that “federal legislation [with regard to surrogacy would] provide[] some
uniformity to temper disparate state legislation”).
267. Currently, at least some federal statutes (including the Social Security Act) look to
state law to decide this question. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2034 (2012) (“[T]he
law Congress enacted calls for resolution . . . by reference to state intestacy law. We cannot
replace that reference by creating a uniform federal rule the statute’s text scarcely supports.”).
In the wake of the Capato decision, however, some commentators have called for the adoption
of a uniform federal rule. See, e.g., Alycia Kennedy, Note, Social Security Survivor Benefits:
Why Congress Must Create a Uniform Standard of Eligibility for Posthumously Conceived
Children, 54 B.C. L. REV. 821, 823 (2013) (arguing that “posthumously conceived children
should not have to rely on state intestacy statutes to qualify for benefits”).
268. Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM.
L.Q. 579, 579 (2005) (emphasis in original).
269. Browne C. Lewis, Dead Men Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of Afterdeath
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these children, the rules vary.270 Here again, given the newness of the issue, there may
be value in allowing experimentation to occur before adopting a single, uniform rule.
This is not to say that the states will always move in what we consider to be the
“right” direction. But because what the “right” direction is may remain unclear at a
given moment in time, it may be beneficial to allow states to develop a variety of
approaches and to be able to see those approaches in action.
Our past reveals other instances when some benefit was derived from local
experimentation with parentage rules. One past example relates to the legal treatment
of nonmarital children. As noted above, historically, children born outside of
marriage were subjected to harsh treatment under the law.271 Initially much (although
not all)272 of the work to mitigate historic discrimination against nonmarital children
was at the state level.273 For example, in the first half of the twentieth century, both
Arizona and Oregon formally eliminated the distinction between marital and
nonmarital children.274 Other states followed, although many did so in a much slower
and more piecemeal fashion.275
The federal government drew upon this state-level experimentation. When
Congress amended the Social Security Act in 1965 to extend greater protection for
some nonmarital children, it borrowed from the more inclusive state standards that
existed at the time.276 Similarly, when Congress amended the Servicemen’s Group
Life Insurance program in 1971 to include a definition of child, it drew from more
protective state-based examples.277 Indeed, as the Senate report on the bill notes, the
amendment “adopt[ed] the most widely accepted criteria established by State law.”278

Children, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 403, 412 (2009) (“Most state legislatures have not enacted
statutes that specifically deal with the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived
children.”).
270. Id. at 426 (“Some variations exist, however, among these statutes.”).
271. See Maldonado, supra note 23, at 346 (“No one would dispute that for most of U.S. history,
‘illegitimate’ children suffered significant legal and societal discrimination.” (footnote omitted)).
272. See supra Part II for examples of federal experimentation on this issue.
273. See KRAUSE, supra note 125, at 5 (noting that some states had adopted a “highly
progressive” approach to nonmarital children with “some states having sought to abolish the
status of illegitimacy by legislative fiat”); see also Note, Status of Issue of Void Marriages, 56
HARV. L. REV. 624, 625 (1943) (noting that “statutes have been enacted in nearly all the
jurisdictions with the purpose of alleviating the predicament of the illegitimate child”). That
said, progress on this front was admittedly slow.
274. See Krause, supra note 156, at 845 (noting that Arizona and Oregon statutes extended
to illegitimate children the “same legal status as children of divorced parents”); see also H. Paul
Breslin, Note, Liability of Possible Fathers: A Support Remedy for Illegitimate Children, 18
STAN. L. REV. 859, 866 (1966) (“Only two states (Arizona and Oregon) have statutes that give
an illegitimate child the status rights to which a legitimate child is entitled.”).
275. See Peter Wendel, Inheritance Rights and the Step-Partner Adoption Paradigm:
Shades of the Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 351, 389
n.205 (2005) (noting the partial attempts by the state of Illinois to reduce the harshness of the
law’s treatment of illegitimate children).
276. See supra notes 151–55 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
278. S. REP. NO. 92-545, at 2.
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Over time, however, there may be diminishing returns from state experimentation.
This may be the case where there has been sufficient airing of the issue and a general
consensus or trend has emerged. At this point, the value of experimentation may be
outweighed by other concerns, including liberty concerns, as well as a desire to
provide families with a greater degree of uniformity. When this is the case, (more)
federal involvement may be appropriate.
While there is benefit to uniformity in almost all areas of law, uniformity and
certainty are particularly salient in the context of family status.279 Even if people do
not have a clear sense of all of the rights they are entitled to by virtue of being a
spouse or child, they nonetheless structure their lives around the understanding that
if something were to happen, there would be some safeguards in place because they
are legally recognized family members. Having certainty about one’s family status
helps people plan for and protect their family members.280 For example, a person
may not get around to writing a medical directive because she knows her spouse
(who she trusts) will have the right to make medical decisions for her should she
become incapacitated.281
Moreover, psychologically, it may be important to people to have a sense that
their family ties are secure. Indeed, it is for this reason that many people choose to
get married; for many, getting married provides a sense of permanence and emotional
security.282 Professor Elizabeth Scott writes, “The social norms and conventions
surrounding marriage influence spousal behavior in a variety of ways that reinforce
the stability of the relationship.”283 There is something deeply unsettling about a
world in which one is considered a child or a parent for some purposes and in some
places but not others. For these and other reasons, June Carbone argues, “[T]he
importance of certainty about family status makes uniformity valuable for reasons
that have only increased with time.”284
The current experience with same-sex married spouses serves as a compelling
illustration of how it can be confusing and practically difficult for people to have
family statuses that flicker on and off as they cross various borders.285 Today, a

279. See Joslin, supra note 115, at 42 (“Parents must have assurance that, once established as
legal parents as a matter of state law, their status is final and certain and will travel with them as
they move about the country. . . . [F]ailure to provide certainty about a child’s legal status can
result in profound emotional harms for the child involved.”); see also Deborah A. Widiss,
Leveling Up After DOMA, 89 IND. L.J. 43, 47–48 (2014) (discussing the harms incurred by
couples whose marital status is not recognized by the federal government).
280. Cf. Smith, supra note 236, at 1593–94 (discussing challenges families face if their
family status is not recognized by other states or the federal government).
281. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 31 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that one of the “protections that the State gives to couples who do marry” is the right
“to make medical decisions for each other”).
282. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 241–42 (2004) (“Symbolically at least, this represents
an expression of each spouse’s willingness to be held accountable for the faithful performance
of marital duties, not only by the other spouse, but also by the broader community.”).
283. Id. at 241.
284. Carbone, supra note 1, at 59.
285. See Joslin, supra note 115, at 33 (discussing the challenges facing same-sex parent
families due to the “inability for same-sex parents to maintain their legal parental status as
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couple may be spouses in their home state of Iowa286 but legal strangers when they
cross the border into Nebraska.287 As a result, one party may be unable to make
medical decisions for his or her spouse should something happen in Nebraska while
on their way home.
If and when the federal government considers becoming involved in family status
determinations, there are a variety of ways in which it can act. Choosing among these
various options can help the federal government weigh and balance these
(sometimes) competing values.
After review, the federal government may determine that there is value in further
innovation and experimentation, and that the states are generally moving in the right
direction. In such circumstances, the federal government may choose to defer to state
family status determinations. Such deference furthers the goal of experimentation.
Moreover, because state laws determine a host of critical rights and obligations
extended or owed to family members, consistent federal deference to state family
status standards can ensure at least some level of uniformity. When federal law defers
to state family status, it means that if one is a spouse or child for state purposes, one
is also a spouse or child for federal purposes.
That said, even if federal law always defers to or incorporates state family status
determinations, there nonetheless may be some disuniformity of family status.288
Again, the current experience of same-sex spouses provides a useful illustration of
this point. Today, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Windsor289 striking down section 3 of DOMA,290 the federal government generally
defers to a person’s marital status under state law.291 But despite this federal

they move about the country”); Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your)
Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2012) (“[M]igratory same-sex couples
face the prospect of wrenching disruption in their lives, loss of parental and property rights,
and an array of other problems and indignities, large and small [as a result of nonrecognition
laws], that a rational legal regime should not tolerate.”).
286. Iowa began permitting same-sex couples to marry in 2009 as the result of a unanimous
decision of that state’s high court in Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
287. Nebraska’s constitution provides that it both does not permit same-sex couples to
marry and that it will not recognize marriages between two people of the same sex entered
into in other jurisdictions. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (“Only marriage between a man and a
woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex
in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid
or recognized in Nebraska.”). This provision was upheld in Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning,
455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
288. See Estin, supra note 35, at 278 (noting that “even with respect to family law matters
regulated exclusively by the states, there may be horizontal or interstate conflicts”).
289. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
290. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the
United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman
as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is
a husband or a wife.”).
291. While the federal government does defer to state law, it is not consistent with regard
to which state’s law it defers. For some benefits, the federal government defers to the state of
celebration; for other benefits, the federal government looks to the state of domicile. See Joslin,
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deference, same-sex spouses still do not have complete certainty about their status.
Instead, every time same-sex spouses or their child crosses a state line, their family status
may be uncertain. This is true because even where there is vertical (that is, federal-state)
recognition, there might not be horizontal or interstate recognition. At least as a matter
of full faith and credit,292 it has long been the case that states are not required to recognize
marriages entered into in other jurisdictions.293 And today, over one-half of states still
purport to refuse to recognize the marital status of same-sex spouses.294
Thus, while localism in the area of family status determinations may ensure
vertical uniformity, it does not necessarily ensure horizontal or interstate uniformity
of family status.295 And the reality is that families are increasingly mobile, frequently
crossing state borders either on temporary trips or on a more permanent basis.296
Because recognition of family status raises both vertical and horizontal recognition
issues, the only way to achieve complete certainty and uniformity of family status would
be to have family status rules determined at the federal level, and only at that level.297
If the federal government believes the states are moving too slowly towards the
proper rule but that further experimentation could be valuable, it could intervene in
a relatively limited way. The federal government could adopt its own family status
rules for a specific federal purpose, but it could continue to allow the states to use
their own definitions for other purposes. One can see this type of limited, early
federal intervention in the history of treatment of nonmarital children. The federal
government initially did not sweep in and demand that the states adopt a particular
parentage rule. Instead, for example, the federal government chose to add a more
inclusive definition of child to the 1917 War Risk Insurance Act.298 At the time, some
states were already moving in the direction of greater protection for nonmarital
children; by the early twentieth century, both Arizona and Oregon formally
eliminated the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children.299 By
following the lead of more inclusive states like Arizona and Oregon, the federal

supra note 56, at 170–71; see generally Kimberly Atkins, Legal Quagmire for Same-Sex
Couples After U.S. Supreme Court’s DOMA Ruling, Aug. 29, 2013, R.I. LAW. WKLY.,
available at 2013 WLNR 22047985.
292. The refusal to recognize an out-of-state marriage may, however, violate principles of
Due Process or Equal Protection. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (striking
down a Virginia law that criminalized evasive interracial marriages entered into in other
jurisdictions).
293. See generally ANDREW KOPPELMAN, SAME SEX, DIFFERENT STATES: WHEN SAME-SEX
MARRIAGES CROSS STATE LINES (2006).
294. Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, http://hrc-assets.s3-website
-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files/assets/resources/marriage-prohibitions_6-10-2014.pdf.
295. See Estin, supra note 35, at 278, 331–34 (discussing vertical and horizontal
recognition of family law matters).
296. Id. at 334 (noting that we live in “an era when individuals and families move easily
across state borders and around the world”).
297. Cf. id. at 278 (noting that, at some point interstate disuniformity may become so great
that there is a need for “mechanisms to address coordination problems arising from variations
among state and local laws”).
298. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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government nudged the other states in this direction, but it did so without entirely
stifling state experimentation.
Using an independent federal family status definition for purposes of one
particular federal benefit may be appropriate where having differing eligibility
standards depending on the child’s home state may contradict the purpose of the
program.300 For example, when the purpose of the program is to compensate a child
for the death or injury to a parent on the high seas—outside the boundaries of any
state—looking to state law may not be the best approach.301 With this type of
approach, the federal government can nudge the states towards greater liberty and
equality without entirely stifling state experimentation.
The challenge presented by this type of approach, however, is that it adds a new
level of disuniformity. It is unquestionably complicated and complex to recognize
people as family members for some purposes but not for others, or by one level of
government but not another. This was sometimes true for nonmarital children. Thus,
in its decision in Labine v. Vincent,302 the Supreme Court noted that the child in
question was considered a child for federal Social Security benefits, even though she
was not entitled to intestate succession rights as a child under Louisiana probate
law.303 That said, there may be instances in which some degree of family status
dissonance is a better alternative to no recognition or protection at all.
At some point, however, this type of limited federal intervention may need to give
way to greater involvement. This may be the case if there has been sufficient
experimentation or where the federal government has concluded that, due to the issue
at hand, greater uniformity is necessary. Under such circumstances, the federal
government could adopt a standard or definition that would apply for all federal
purposes, or it could even require the states to adopt and enforce that definition as
well. Adopting a family status definition that applies for all purposes could (but
would not necessarily) enhance individual liberties, and it certainly would further the
goal of ensuring uniformity of status.
Some scholars suggest that surrogacy is an area of family law in which more
federal participation may be appropriate. Surrogacy arrangements commonly involve
multiple jurisdictions and, given the state-level variation in surrogacy regulation, it
is not unusual for multiple jurisdictions to have wildly different rules.304 In addition,
because surrogacy involves conception, pregnancy, and family formation, there are
important liberty interests at stake.305 For these and other reasons, some

300. See supra notes 146–55 and accompanying text.
301. See Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 329 (2d Cir. 1934) (“To allow
the law of the state of the decedent’s domicile to prevail would permit and deny for the same
accident a right of recovery [under the Death on the High Seas Act] to relatives who were
similarly related to persons killed because of residence in different jurisdictions.”).
302. 401 U.S. 532, 539–40 (1971) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Louisiana’s
intestate succession provisions that treated legitimate and illegitimate children differently).
303. See supra note 126.
304. For a discussion of the conflict of interest issues that may arise in surrogacy
arrangements, see generally Susan Frelich Appleton, Surrogacy Arrangements and the
Conflict of Laws, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 399 (1990).
305. See SaraAnn C. Bennett, Comment, “There’s No Wrong Way to Make a Family”:
Surrogacy Law and Pennsylvania’s Need for Legislative Intervention, 118 PENN ST. L. REV.
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commentators argue that “[f]ederal regulation of surrogacy arrangements [would
be] ideal.”306
To be clear, in describing these types of federal involvement in ascending order
of intrusiveness, I do not mean to suggest that early, aggressive federal involvement
in family status determinations is never appropriate. Because we are talking about
issues or interests of constitutional import, there may be times when early federal
intervention is not only helpful, but indeed, may be necessary. That said, when early
federal involvement in an issue is being considered, policymakers should take into
account potential costs of such conduct—costs related to the lost experimentation, as
well as potential loss of community buy-in. If the intervention is too soon,
policymakers may adopt a rule that is not the best they could have come up with had
they thought about and experimented with the issue a bit more.
Kerry Abrams and Brandon Garrett argue this may have been the case with regard
to the use of DNA evidence in some paternity proceedings.307 Almost as soon as
DNA evidence became available, the federal government hamstrung the states’
ability to decide what to do with this information in some contexts.308 Specifically,
Congress passed a “series of acts that increasingly conditioned states’ receipt of
welfare funds to the identification of genetic fathers.”309 Abrams and Garrett suggest
that this federal involvement may have been too early, and may have stifled what
otherwise may have been productive state experimentation about when, whether, and
how states should use DNA evidence in their parentage rules.310
Looking outside the context of family law, some commentators argue that the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)311 is another example where the
federal government intervened too soon. GINA bars discrimination in employment
and insurance on the basis of genetic information and limits the collection and use of
such information.312 Some commentators argue that GINA was premature.313 Prior
to GINA’s enactment, there had been few examples of such discrimination and little
time for courts to consider how to address any such discrimination when it occurred.
Other commentators worry that the law is not well drafted and may create

407, 410 n.12 (2013) (“Federal regulation of surrogacy arrangements . . . would create clarity
on the issue and uniformity between jurisdictions.”); Emily Gelmann, “I’m Just the Oven, It’s
Totally Their Bun”: The Power and Necessity of the Federal Government To Regulate
Commercial Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements and Protect the Legal Rights of Intended
Parents, 32 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 159, 161 (2011) (arguing “that the federal government should
comprehensively address all aspects of commercial gestational surrogacy”).
306. Bennett, supra note 305.
307. Abrams & Garrett, supra note 189, at 42 (arguing that federal requirements “have
forced states to adopt policies they might not otherwise have chosen”).
308. See id.
309. Id. at 37.
310. Id. at 15 (“In fact, a common argument against GINA was that it was premature, since
genetic discrimination was infrequent.”).
311. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat.
881 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29, 42 U.S.C. (2012)).
312. Jessica L. Roberts, Preempting Discrimination: Lessons from the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act, 63 VAND. L. REV. 439, 441 (2010).
313. Id. (“GINA’s opponents cited the lack of existing genetic-information discrimination
as evidence that the law was premature or unnecessary.”).
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unanticipated problems going forward.314 If, however, we had had more experience
with laws of this sort, the drafters may have been able to foresee these challenges
and address them accordingly.
In the end, there is no simple answer or equation for determining when federal
involvement in family status determinations is appropriate. Indeed, our history serves
as an important reminder that one should be wary of simple or bright line rules
regarding which level of government is the appropriate or best one to act with regard
to family status.315 There have been times when the states have led the way to what
we now view as the correct answer. At other times, it has been the federal government
that has had to act to push resistant states towards this end.
But we are not left without any moorings or direction. Instead, the values of
federalism and the lessons from our history provide important insights that guide
consideration of this question. Rather than relying on rigid, bright-line rules,
policymakers must instead consider how various approaches affect a range of values
or interests including experimentation, liberty, and uniformity. When considering
whether federal involvement in family status determinations is appropriate, it is
particularly important for decisionmakers to consider the value of uniformity. That
said, it is also important to recognize that this value may be outweighed by other
considerations. And when uniformity or stability of family status—whether it be
one’s status as a child or a spouse—results in no protection at all, the scales may tip
in the other direction.
While this mixed history could be looked upon as cause for alarm or concern, it
could also be viewed from the flip side.
A key advantage of having multiple levels of government is the
availability of alternative actors to solve important problems. If the
federal government fails to act, state and local government action is still
possible. If states fail to deal with an issue, federal or local action is
possible. In other words, the greatest beauty of federalism is its
redundancy: multiple levels of government over the same territory and
population, each with the ability to act.316
CONCLUSION
The conventional narrative is that all or some part of family law is inherently local.
This narrative has proven to be remarkably resilient. Despite critiques from a variety
of perspectives, the myth of family law localism lives on, albeit in a slightly more
narrow fashion. This Article subjects the most recent iteration of family law localism—

314. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Regulating the Use of Genetic Information: Perspectives
from the U.S. Experience, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 693, 693–94 (2010) (“This
examination suggests that relying solely on an anti-discrimination framework is likely to be
inadequate; the key to preventing misuse of genetic information by employers will be creating
robust privacy protections.”).
315. Other scholars have made similar arguments regarding other areas of law. See, e.g.,
Huntington, supra note 30, at 834 (“Although some commentators contend that non-citizens
are at greater risk when the states take a more active role in the regulation of immigration, this
hypothesis has not always proven true as an empirical matter.” (footnote omitted)).
316. Chemerinsky, supra note 36, at 538.
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family status localism—to careful scrutiny. Family status localism, like the broader
invocations of the myth, is misguided. A closer examination of our past reveals many
examples of shared state and federal authority over family status determinations.
Once we recognize that the federal government does not categorically lack power
over family status determinations, we must then contend with the normative
questions that have long been ignored—whether and when the federal government
should exercise this power. Given the broad range of protections, benefits, and
responsibilities that are accorded to people by virtue of their family status,
engagement with this question is critical and long overdue.
Drawing upon the rich literature exploring the values of federalism, a literature
that until now has largely omitted consideration of family law, this Article offers a
framework for answering this normative question. This framework seeks to
maximize the benefits garnered from local control, but at the same time guard against
the dangers of dogmatic family status localism.

